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ABSTRACT

TRANSCENDENTAL CONVERSATIONS: ALCHEMICAL DISCOURSE IN
ROMANTIC PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE

Elizabeth Brocious
Department of English
Master of Arts

Alchemical imagery and ideology is present in many Romantic works of
literature, but it has largely been overlooked by literary historians in their
contextualization of the time period. The same can be said for mysticism in general, of
which alchemy is a subset. This project accounts for alchemy in the works of
transcendental philosophers and writers as it contributes to some of the most important
conversations of the Romantic time period, particularly the reaction against empirical
philosophy and the articulation of creative processes. The transcendental conversation is
a transnational one, encompassing Germany, Britain, and America, with its use of
alchemy also following this transnational progression.
The German idealists developed an epistemology that took from alchemical
precepts that in turn informed their spiritual models of genius and the creative process.

German idealism largely influenced Romantic conceptions of art and creativity, which
then contributed to the Romantic ideal of a poet-prophet. Samuel Taylor Coleridge and
Nathaniel Hawthorne further developed their own models of the creative process by
incorporating alchemy as an image of the transformation from vision into art. I examine
Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan” and Hawthorne’s “The Artist of the Beautiful” for their
alchemical imagery that articulates such a genius ideal. I also found, however, that these
two Romantic works express an awareness of artistic limitations and frustration in the
face of this ideal, which illustrates the ambiguity these two writers are known for. But
alchemy, as a discourse of contradictions and their negotiation, is a site that
accommodates the tension between a posited ideal and the reality of actual experience.
As such, alchemy, as an underlying ideology to the poet-prophet, allows for flexibility in
an artist’s identity. Furthermore, as a deeply personal philosophy of transformation,
alchemy’s image as a work of art suggests the artist’s personal investment in the creative
process, which is necessary to art’s viability in an increasingly materialistic world.
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Brocious 1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE TRANSCENDENTAL CONVERSATION
This project began with a recognition of the pervasive alchemy in Nathaniel
Hawthorne’s stories, which then raised the question for me, how did an obscure quasiscience find its way into the stories of a Puritan-haunted American? As I came to be
better acquainted with alchemy and its underwriting philosophy of Hermeticism, I
recognized its imagery and ideology in many other Romantic texts of literature and
philosophy, among them Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Keats, Mary Shelley, Percy
Shelley, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Edgar Allan Poe, G. W. F. Hegel
and F. W. J. Schelling, as well as later poets such as Robert Browning, W. B. Yeats and
T. S. Eliot. Such widespread occurrences of similar tropes and ideas suggest that
alchemy, at least in its most generically mystical form, has saturated Western thought.
To some this may seem like an obvious and unexciting statement, but to others alchemy
will forever be tied to irrationalism, superstition, and magic, so that any kinship between
post-Enlightenment canonical writers and alchemy is hard to believe.
Writing about alchemy’s relationship to scientific history, Patricia Fara states that
the recognition of Isaac Newton as an alchemist would have been considered “almost
blasphemous” until only fifty years ago because of the marginalized place alchemy has
occupied since the Scientific Revolution of the 1600s (500). Scientific attitudes toward
alchemy are also indicative of attitudes within philosophy and literature. Indeed,
alchemy is a word that often comes with negative associations of mad scientists,
gullibility in believing the impossible, and even witchcraft, sorcery, and other dark
supernatural phenomena, so that critics often find it difficult to take it seriously in major
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literary works. The category of mysticism in general, in fact, has been met with
resistance, as Leigh Eric Schmidt claims in “The Making of Modern ‘Mysticism,’” and I
believe that Schmidt’s claims for mysticism apply to alchemy as well. He shows how
most religious historians tend to overlook the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in their
analysis of mysticism. This “gaping eighteenth- and nineteenth-century hole,” he points
out, “skims across many of the most important developments within the category’s
modern formation” (275). The reason for this historical hole, he asserts, is that mysticism
has largely been dismissed as an illusion of essentialism, so that religious historians don’t
take it seriously enough to provide it a place in history. Schmidt makes the claim,
though, that regardless of the criticisms we may now legitimately level at mysticism, it
served a purpose for those who wrote in its name and who thereby contributed to its
formation as a category of religious and philosophical experience. As such, it deserves
consideration as something that was valid to the past as present to itself. Alchemy, as one
of these “important developments” within mysticism’s formation has also, I believe, been
largely overlooked as a valid window into the Romantic time period. As such, I suggest
it is, as a subset of mysticism, “a modern artifact” (Schmidt 276) worthy of our attention.
Although, alchemy is now actually receiving more notice in the historical
accounts of science, philosophy and literature (hence, Fara’s observations that Newton’s
identity as an alchemist is now acceptable), alchemical interpretations of literary texts are
still few. Of the articles and books on literary alchemy that do exist, too many of them do
nothing more than spell out in tedious detail what each alchemical reference and symbol
means, but little analysis has been done that places the specific use of alchemy (as
opposed to a generally esoteric tradition) in larger cultural, historical or philosophical
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contexts. Notwithstanding this general oversight, however, a few texts are noteworthy
for their contributions. The first major work of literary criticism that recognizes the
impact of Hermeticism on Romanticism is M. H. Abrams’ Natural Supernaturalism
(1971). Abrams explains that the Romantic worldview was heavily influenced by two
forms of “traditional wisdom,” Hebrew Kabbala and Christian Hermeticism (155),
thereby giving credit for Romanticism’s mystic leanings to the esoteric traditions that had
been a prevalent part of European thought for centuries. Kabbala and Hermeticism are
part of the same mystical tradition, and they deal with supernatural means of arriving at
knowledge, such as visions and revelations. Abrams points out that even though “lunatic
fringes” existed in them, much that had evolved from them “had been a reputable, indeed
an almost universally accepted part of the intellectual universe” (170). Even though
Abrams mentions alchemy only briefly in relation to Hermeticism, the philosophical
milieu of the Romantic period as described by him is fraught with terminology that also
informs the alchemical imagery of regeneration: words and phrases such as union,
regeneration, marriage, reconciliation of opposites, renovated world, make young again,
the whole, the One, and circuitous also dominate the alchemical vocabulary. In fact, the
terms Hermeticism and alchemy are themselves synonymous terms when used in the
context of this imagery.
Predictably, Abrams’s Romanticism is chiefly European, and he illustrates his
arguments through the writings of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and German philosophers
such as Hegel. Although he gives cursory attention to the Americans, he illustrates
Hermeticism as a mainly European phenomenon, stating that the American
Transcendentalists merely “seized upon and expanded the assertions by Coleridge,

Brocious 4
Wordsworth, Carlyle, and their German contemporaries” (412). Arthur Versluis,
however, offers more independent avenues of American Hermeticism in his book The
Esoteric Origins of the American Renaissance (2001). He provides extensive evidence
that Hermeticism, including alchemy, has always had a place in both worldview and
practice in America, claiming it was initially transmitted across the Atlantic during
America’s colonization. As Randall Clack further observes, the use of alchemical tropes
in particular by American writers such as Edgar Allan Poe, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and
Margaret Fuller is common, especially as those tropes represent the theme of
regeneration. The fact that American writers use alchemical imagery is not surprising, as
Clack describes it, because the history of the New World is fraught with alchemical
mythology. He lists some of the early explorers who came to America looking for
unlimited wealth and youth, Cortez’s City of Gold, Ponce de Leon’s Fountain of Youth,
and Coronado’s Seven Cities of Gold among them (5). He also observes that Hector de
Crevecoeur’s image of a melting pot is an “alchemical/metallurgical image” that
encompasses the promise many saw in America as a land of transformation (6).
Contextualization of alchemy tends to fall along national lines, with distinctions
of its use being made according to the traditions and assumptions of each geographic
area. While such claims are plausible, I have also noticed a correlation between alchemy
and transcendental philosophy, and this relationship appears to emerge within a more
transnational conversation. Transcendentalism as we speak of it now is usually attributed
to the early nineteenth-century American circle of writers and thinkers that included
Ralph Waldo Emerson and Bronson Alcott, but these Americans were actually part of a
larger exchange regarding knowledge, consciousness, and aesthetics that took Immanuel
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Kant’s transcendental philosophy as their foundation. Emerson himself acknowledges
how Kant’s philosophy has “deeply colored the conversation and poetry of the present
day” (86), and he provides a transnational context for this conversation:
It is well known to most of my [1842] audience that the Idealism of the
present day acquired the name of Transcendental from the use of that term
by Immanuel Kant, of Konisgberg …The extraordinary profoundness and
precision of that man’s thinking have given vogue to his nomenclature, in
Europe and America, to that extent that whatever belongs to the class of
intuitive thought is popularly called at the present day Transcendental.
(86)
In addition to the Americans, then, the German idealists of the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries as well as Coleridge, who made attempts to be a philosopher after
the pattern of the Germans, also wrote under the transcendental rubric. In this project,
therefore, I use the term “transcendental” to signify this philosophical system that in turn
“deeply colored,” as Emerson suggests, particular aesthetic practices (the “poetry of the
present day”). The Germans, British, and Americans alike contributed to this
transcendental conversation.
In this chapter, I show alchemical principles that play an important role in the
works of the German idealists. German idealism was an influential philosophy of the
Romantic time period, especially as it further developed and disseminated Kant’s theories
throughout Europe and America. Kant’s texts are not themselves alchemical, although
many of his mystical precepts may be termed Hermetic. His German successors,
however, formulated their own transcendental systems within an alchemical ideology.
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Here I emphasize their most significant alchemical and Hermetic ideas as those ideas
contributed to the alchemical elements of the larger transcendental conversation. The
formation of an alchemical transcendentalism by the Germans, then, sets the stage for the
same kinds of appropriations among the literary writers who also engaged in
transcendental discourse. I discuss two of these writers, Samuel Taylor Coleridge and
Nathaniel Hawthorne, in the following two chapters. By placing Romantic artists within
German parameters, I hope to illustrate the dissemination of transcendental ideas beyond
its own field of philosophy. This diffusion of transcendentalism, I believe, was an
important source for the precepts of alchemy and their appropriation for aesthetic
practices during the Romantic time period.
Alchemy
Because alchemy has become a somewhat obscure literary allusion, its symbolism
is often lost on a contemporary reader. Before I can embark on a discussion of its place
within transcendental philosophy, therefore, it is necessary for me to explain its basic
precepts.
Alchemy, in a nutshell, is a philosophy of transformation, particularly the
transforming of lead into gold. At its foundation is the belief that all tangible matter is
made from a prime substance (prima materia) that is the equivalent of spirit. The theory
of transformation relies on the belief of the prima materia because it is through this
common substance that all the various materials of nature may claim kinship, and it is
through this kinship that materials may cross over from one thing to another. Thus, in
theory, the so-called contingent qualities of a substance, such as what makes a mineral
lead instead of gold, may be changed out according to the purpose of the alchemist, but
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the essential quality of the substance (the prima materia or “quintessence”) will always
remain the same. It is through this essential substance that all matter is seen as
possessing a soul. Humans, as part of this system of prima materia, have an intelligence
that is derived from God, but they resemble God more closely than other forms of nature.
The alchemist, consequently, relates himself in a synecdochical correspondence as the
microcosm of a larger universe. Thus, man is God in miniature, a replica of the divine.
While prima materia is also used to mean the substances in their base or prime condition,
the context is always within this correspondence to the Divine, so that the base substance
contains “the seed of gold” or the divine attributes that makes the potential of that
transformation possible.
This principle of correspondence originates from Hermeticism, which serves as
alchemy’s philosophical and theological foundation. The terms “alchemy” and
“Hermeticism” are so closely related that many scholars use them interchangeably;
however, Hermeticism is a more general philosophy from which different sects branch
out, such as the Freemasons, Rosicrucians, and Illuminati. Alchemy, then, is one
member within a larger family of Hermetic denominations, but it distinguishes itself with
the use of metallurgical or chemical imagery, as opposed to, say, the Freemasons who
employ images relating to building cathedrals and stonework. Generally, the term
“hermetic” refers to the mystery tradition of Western culture in a nonspecific way as that
tradition posits knowledge through divine intuition or communication (Drury 115-116).
Specifically, Hermeticism is a genre of writings that call on, write to, or claim authorship
from Hermes Trismegistus, the “thrice great,” who is a mythical figure derived from
Egyptian mythology. These texts, called the Hermetica, portray Hermes as a teacher and
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seer of esoteric knowledge, who then imparts his wisdom to Tat and Asclepius through
dialogues that are similar to Plato’s.
The Hermetica texts were written between 100 to 300 CE (Copenhaver xliv),
placing them close to the Neoplatonic writings of Plotinus. 1 As such, they describe a
theological system based on the “One” god who is the first cause of the universe and
from whom a chain of cause and effect emanates. According to Hermes, God and his
creations are always in motion: “God is not idle, else everything would be idle, for each
and every thing is full of god. Nowhere in the cosmos nor in any other thing is there
idleness” (38). This becoming is made possible by a soul that exists outwardly in the
universe and “brings it to life” (38). Significantly, the becoming of God and humans is
done primarily in the mind. Hermeticism is, therefore, a mystical philosophy of
consciousness. Such mysticism that relies on the emerging consciousness of god and
man becomes an especially important principle to the allegorical practices of alchemy
and later to transcendental philosophy.
In order to understand alchemy more fully, we may divide it into the two
categories of exoteric and esoteric functions. On the surface, the exoteric function is more
straightforward than the mystical complexities of the esoteric, and it is what most people
think of when referencing alchemy because it has to do with the physical act of metal
transformation. Its central tableau is the scientist who works in a laboratory with ovens,
crucibles, substances and the prima materia in order to discover the gold-making or
elixir-making process. This elixir is the philosopher’s stone, otherwise known as the
lapis, Elixir of Life (elixir vitae), philosophical gold, and a myriad of other terms that
1

See Brian P. Copenhaver’s introduction to the Hermetica, in which he provides
a thorough contextualization of the Hermetic texts.
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were used to describe and hide at the same time. 2 Application of the philosopher’s stone
to any given substance would instantly transform that substance into gold. This elixir
also made claims to immortality. In addition, the quest for the philosopher’s stone was
manifest to a lesser degree in the medical pursuit of a universal panacea so that the early
study of medicine was highly fraught with alchemical philosophy.
The second category of alchemy, esotericism, is a move toward the symbolic, and
it is actually more to the point of what alchemists felt their pursuit was about. The
esoteric function has to do with the philosophical and spiritual nature of alchemy, where
the laboratory work came to represent the inner workings of the soul. As alchemists
worked on the metals and substances in their lab, they saw a symbolic connection
between the purifying stages of the metallic refining process and the struggles humans
face in life. They saw the fire and heat of their ovens as symbolic of suffering and
hardship, they saw the solutions applied to the metals as washings that purified, and they
saw the promise of gold as symbolic of the potential for humankind’s exaltation. In this
sense, then, chemical transformations of substances were a visible link to the inner
workings of the soul. The ultimate goal for an esoteric alchemist was a transmutation of
self—more so than metals—from base to purified nature, creating inner union through
the metaphorical processes of death (i.e. spiritual loss or failure) and rebirth (i.e. spiritual
achievement or progress) by fire (i.e. suffering). Because they believed that the spiritual
is inherent in all matter, everything is essentially spiritual; therefore, material

2

The philosopher’s stone was a completely theoretical substance; according to C.
G. Jung, no one has ever produced the philosopher’s stone (239). For a complete
description of alchemy and its precepts, see his Psychology and Alchemy 227-241;
Linden’s introduction to Darke Hierogliphicks 1-36; and Taylor.
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experiments were means to ultimately spiritual ends. It is significant to understand that
all exoteric experiments were done with this ultimate goal in mind.
The processes of alchemy are often described as discrete stages that an adept
needs to pass through in order to come to the final stage of the philosopher’s stone.
These stages incorporate both the exoteric and the esoteric functions of alchemy and, as I
have mentioned, are described based on the visual appearance and effects of the
laboratory substance and then applied metaphorically to the adept himself. At different
time periods and among different alchemists the number of required stages varied in
number from twelve to seven to four, but finally came to rest, according to Jung, at three
around the fifteenth or sixteenth century in order to reflect the number in the trinity (22930). 3
These three alchemical stages are described by three corresponding colors: 1)
black, signifying darkness or chaos that is already present in the prima materia, that is
brought on by the separation of elements, or that results from the death of a product that
was created from a previous union of opposites; 2) white, representing a washing
(baptisma) or resurrection, which carries with it the idea of rebirth —often spoken of in
terms of the moon, silver, daybreak or Queen; and 3) red, symbolizing the reaction of the
material to the heat as it is raised to its highest intensity, through which a final fusion is
effected. This last stage contains the symbolism of the sun, sunrise, and King, who unites
with the Queen to form a union of opposites. The offspring from this union will
eventually die to begin the process anew (Jung 227-232).
3

The appropriation of the trinity in the alchemical stages is indicative of the
relationship between alchemy and Christianity in Europe during the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance. As a symbol of purification and regeneration, Christ stands as the ultimate
philosopher’s stone.
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Transcendentalists particularly use the first and last stages in their imagery. The
first is associated with separation and then sublimation, which in chemical terms refers to
the process of changing a liquid to a gas. Stanton J. Linden provides an alchemical
definition of sublimation as “the distilling process, in name derived from the ‘elevation’
or ‘exaltation’ of the materials circulating in the still.” Taking his definition from Sir
George Ripley, Linden notes that the first purpose of sublimation is to “make the body
spiritual.” Linden also quotes John Read’s explanation of sublimation: “when repeated
many times it was supposed to furnish the ‘quintessence’ of the material concerned” (18).
A favorite image of sublimation is an ascending winged creature from a dark emblem of
its base self, signifying the spiritual transformation of matter. Sublimation is seen as a
liminal stage because it brings the adept to a threshold where further transformation is
possible.
The last stage is associated with a reconciliation or conjunction. As Linden
defines it, “Conjunction is the union of the two opposing, sexually differentiated
principles, Sulphur and Mercury […], variously referred to as male and female, king and
queen, the red man and the white wife, brother and sister, and many other forms” (17).
This stage forges a working relationship with paradox, and among its favorite images are
sexual embraces and marriage. It is important to note that “the [alchemical] process is a
repetition of the stages gone before” (Taylor 143), so that the stages are seen to work in
cycles, with the adept moving backward and forward in smaller units as he moves overall
toward the end goal. This back and forth movement represents the death and rebirth an
alchemist undergoes, with the death acting as an equally important function as the rebirth.
This movement also results in abundant circular or mandala emblems within alchemy,
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which signifies the stages and their continual repetitions and reconciliations as well as the
wholeness brought on by the successful completion of the philosopher’s stone.
As mentioned previously, alchemy’s origins are traditionally linked to the
Hermetica, ancient texts that served as the basis for most mystical sects. However, in
The Forge and the Crucible: The Origins and Structures of Alchemy (1978), Mircea
Eliade traces alchemical thought processes back to the rituals and myths of primitive
man. He explains how the earliest smiths viewed the earth as a Mother from whom they
tenuously aborted sacred embryos from the womb when gathering the ore they used in
their work. Because the ores came from a living Earth-Mother, they contained the same
living substance; as such, the ores were gendered to reflect the literal facts of the birth
process. The later combination of the ores in the fires of the smith was seen as a magical
“marriage of metals” from which a new birth could arise (37). This marriage was
accompanied with various symbolic sexual rituals that are meant to symbolize the divine
creative process. Thus, as I have already noted, alchemy is fraught with marriage and
sexual symbolism; inherent in the symbol of a marriage is the primitive concept of a
union of opposites within nature in which the division between the opposing gendered
elements is overcome to form a new wholeness.
Furthermore, a central theme of alchemy as explained by Eliade is that man takes
the place of time in his quest to perfect materials. Primitive man believed that the ores
and metals in the earth would eventually become gold if left to themselves, but if humans
could speed up the process, regeneration could occur at a much faster rate. Alchemists,
then, served as a proxy for time. Inherent in this role of the alchemists is the assumption
that progress will happen by default—that nature will inevitably refine the materials if
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left to its natural processes—and that man’s role is merely to be a part of this autonomous
progress. Indeed, Eliade reminds us that the hope of post-Enlightenment science is
steeped with the alchemical goal of “infinite progress” through the transformation and
improvement of nature (172). Such an assumption is significant in understanding how
alchemical philosophy and imagery fits within the Romantic time period, for the
philosophy of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries shares the same
assumption of inevitable progress with alchemy.
Transcendentalism
Although alchemy began as a precursor to science and medicine, the Scientific
Revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries sloughed off anything that could
be deemed superstitious, and alchemy became one such casualty. Interestingly, alchemy
survives in literature and philosophy, which can be attributed to two of its characteristics:
its metaphorical practices and its doctrine that combines the material with the spiritual.
As an established spiritual discourse especially, alchemy emerges in transcendental
reactions against the materialism that had dominated philosophy since Newton.
In an introduction to Isaac Newton’s writings on the philosophy of nature, John
Herman Randall notes that the “point of departure” for the transcendentalists “remained
Newton’s Nature,” despite the fact that they spent more time trying “to get away from or
pass beyond” it than embracing it as unqualified truth (xiv). The transcendentalists were
particularly threatened by the implications of mechanistic theories of nature because such
theories tend to ignore or reject spiritual considerations. As a result, the
transcendentalists reassert concepts of divine essences and microcosmic correspondences
to a world soul and to a spiritualized nature. The concept of spirit helped them explain
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the teleology of nature and man: nature may be a series of parts that work together as a
mechanism, but that mechanism also has a purposiveness that cannot be explained by
empiricism alone. Thus, as many people were becoming disillusioned with science’s
supposed monopoly on knowledge, the transcendentalists insisted that truth comes in
many forms and that spiritual origination of knowledge is just as important and
productive as truth derived from a scientific method. Alchemy, as a spiritual philosophy
that also incorporates elements of empiricism, serves as a conciliator to this paradigmatic
binary between spirit and matter.
As I have mentioned, the beginning point for transcendental philosophy and
literature is Immanuel Kant. Kant’s writings represent “The Copernican Turn” for
Enlightenment thought in that he established the subjective consciousness as an absolute
mediator to cognition and, as such, the structuring instrument of individual reality. This
model of consciousness is different from the hitherto prevailing belief that the mind is a
passive receptacle of information and knowledge. On the contrary, self-consciousness,
according to Kant, acts as a barrier to the supersensible and noumenal realm, that is, to
the realm of essences and of things-in-themselves, so that truth can only be derived from
bodily sensations and the intuitions they posit. In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
explains his concept of subjectivity: “From all this it undeniably follows that the pure
concepts of understanding can never admit of transcendental but always only of
empirical employment, and that the principles of pure understanding can apply only to
objects of the senses under the universal conditions of a possible experience” (264).
In presenting the empirical as an antithesis to the transcendental Kant does not,
however, completely negate transcendental intuition. He merely points out the limits of

Brocious 15
our mental capabilities. The term transcendental refers to the possibility of cognizing the
supersensible realm and, therefore, to our intellectual capacity to go beyond the limits of
sensory understanding. Accordingly, a transcendental concept is an ideal that posits
representations of things, rather than the things themselves; it is capable only of
anticipation rather than actualization (264). But the ideal is still a cognition that has
meaning, even if that meaning resides in a realm outside of sensory existence. Hence,
inherent in Kant’s transcendental idealism is his concept of a priori knowledge, which is
associated with intuition and inner perception. An a priori concept is knowledge that
necessarily exists before sensory experience and acts as supersensible experience. It may
be realized through the senses, but it does not rely on the senses for its existence.
Because it originally exists outside sensory experience, when an individual recognizes it
as truth, he or she recognizes that it must have always been truth. In that way, it resides
within the realm of absolutes, which is also the realm of morality and purposive
teleology. 4
This model of a subjective consciousness was immediately compelling and farreaching. After Kant, the mediation of the self-consciousness on knowledge and
cognition could not be ignored any more than Newton’s empirical laws of mechanism
could be. For those who inherited Kant’s philosophy, specifically the German idealists
and the literary writers they influenced, it became their new starting point. Thus, all
credible texts from Kant forward took his model of subjectivity as an assumption, as
Coleridge illustrates in Biographia Literaria: “That the self-consciousness is the fixed
4

Kant provides an important distinction between the terms “transcendental” and
“transcendent.” Transcendental is associated with a priori knowledge and resides within
experience. Transcendent is “mere thought” that exists outside of experience; as such, it
cannot be a means to knowledge (Pluhar xxxvii).

Brocious 16
point, to which for us all is mortised and annexed, needs no further proof” (300). As a
result, much of transcendental philosophy and literature deals with psychological issues,
especially as the activity of the self-consciousness defines moral character through its
transcendental movement toward a priori knowledge. Alchemy, with its conception of
becoming that leads to moral knowledge and action, is an apt image of this transcendental
consciousness.
At this point, one might conjecture that Jung’s work on consciousness and
alchemy will be the model from which I will base my conclusions. While Jung’s work is
compelling for psychology and the interpretation of dreams, I am not convinced that
Jung’s biological collective unconscious accounts for the dissemination of alchemical
tropes within Romantic philosophy and literature. Instead, I see this process as occurring
more within the social framework of textual influence. Alchemy had saturated the
folkloric practices of the world of letters during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth
centuries, especially in Germany as Glenn Alexander Magee points out. 5 Indeed, the
writers within the world of letters were subject to religious, familial, literary, and other
cultural environments. Hence, I rely heavily on Jung only for his thorough explanations
of alchemy’s history and precepts. But for the narrative of alchemy’s dissemination
throughout Romantic philosophy and literature, I rely on a social model. I will begin this
narrative with the German idealists whose transcendental/alchemical philosophy served
as a springboard for much of Romanticism’s literary production.
German Idealism
The German philosophers who succeeded Kant appropriated the term
5

See Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition, Chapters 1 and 2 for Magee’s
contextualization of alchemy and Hermeticism within German culture.
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“transcendental” to describe their system of philosophy, which is basically a system of
epistemology (philosophy was discussed in terms of systems in order to compete with the
prevailing scientific methods of discovery). By virtue of the term “transcendental,” these
German idealists dealt primarily with intuition, which was seen to be a spiritual
phenomenon. Thus, their systems serve, in effect, as apologetics for spiritual knowledge.
As a source for this spiritual discourse, many of them took from earlier mystical writers
such as Jacob Bohme, Giordano Bruno and F. C. Oetinger, who in turn took from
Hermeticism and alchemy for their own philosophical outlook. As such, the
transcendental system of philosophy that reigned in the late eighteenth century may be
seen as part of a long-standing mystical tradition.
Although the idealists worked within the spiritual realm of intuition and essences,
they stayed within the boundaries of material reality, so that their systems sought to
establish a relationship between spirit and matter. But because matter had been
championed to the point that it threatened the spiritual, they emphasized the spiritual in
order to reassert its equal prominence in the process of discovering knowledge. Their
systems do not negate material reality altogether, then, as some criticism of
transcendentalism would imply, but rather they suggest the material is the means to the
spiritual, and vice versa, with the human consciousness acting as a mediator between the
material and spiritual. At their most basic level, these transcendental systems incorporate
a fundamental principle of alchemy: negotiation between opposing elements of nature
necessarily leads to a fusion between them.
One function of the spiritual side of consciousness, according to the idealists, is
its ability to conceptualize perfection, and, as a result, their philosophy is infused with
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optimism regarding the potential of human morality on both an individual and societal
level. Even though they acknowledge human limitations, they tend to emphasize the
possibilities over the impossibilities of human nature. Hermetic alchemy, with its tropes
of becoming, self-refinement through reconciliation, and inevitable progression, is used
as rhetorical devices within this idealist discourse. At the root of human capacity for
perfection is a correspondence to the One, which represents the ideal of unity, harmony,
and synthesis of the inner individual as well as of society as a whole. These terms
represent the common assumptions among the transcendentalists as a group, especially as
they signify a compelling hope for universal harmony amidst the social and political
upheavals of the Romantic time period. Because imperfect men and women cannot effect
universal peace on their own, the Hermetic One, at least, offered the conceptualization of
ultimate unity and the justification to work toward that unity.
The Hermetic One, then, is a means for the idealists to explain the functions of the
intuition that serves as the means for human perfection. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, for
example, claims in 1794, “the vocation of man” is to “perfect himself without end” (9),
and he justifies this vocation through his concept of Ego, which includes a “pure I” that
gives all humans an absolute self-identity through reason. This “pure I” is the central
location from which all empirical knowledge is subsumed and then transformed into a
priori knowledge, and it has absolute credibility because it is part of an eternal, and
therefore ethical, identity, i.e. it is the source of the Good. Other transcendentalists posit
variations of this same theory with different emphases and terminology but with similar
implications: in addition to Fichte’s Ego is Schelling’s world soul and Hegel’s absolute
Spirit (and later Emerson’s Over-Soul). The Good of these systems can be explained in
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Hermetic terms: it is an intuitive presence that exists through a human microcosmic
correspondence to an absolute macrocosm, and it, therefore, makes self-perfection
possible through its emanating qualities of unity, wholeness, ethics, and wisdom.
Hegel’s system of absolute Spirit is particularly Hermetic. Indeed, Magee claims
that Hegel is not merely influenced by Hermetic texts but that his writings are Hermetic
texts. His philosophy is also specifically alchemical. In the preface to Phenomenology of
Spirit, he portrays the events of history as a perpetual dialectic, in which opposites are
posited, reciprocally negated, and eventually reconciled within an advancing universal
Spirit in its quest for self-knowledge. His system (what he terms “Science”) contains an
obvious affinity to alchemy in its spiritual quest of reconciling opposites. But even more,
Hegel is concerned with reducing concepts down to their essence (the “simplicity”)—just
as alchemists attempted to reduce a substance down to the prima materia in order to
understand its essence—and then with gathering each essence together to form a whole
Notion. Thus, Hegel’s system undertakes no less than to get at the absolute core of
knowledge.
From this core, Hegel’s system progresses through what is, in effect, the
alchemical stages, where a new Notion eventually arises out of the death of its old form.
The process begins with a subject and object, the thesis and antithesis, that work through
oppositions in a process of negation—not negation that merely knocks down or erases,
however, but one that results in a positive whole where the negative and its opposite are
both essential to a new unit of knowledge. Hegel attests to “the tremendous power of the
negative” (19) for its ability to separate concepts, for, he says, “what is thus separated
and non-actual is an essential moment” (18). The language and principles here are
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alchemical as they relate to the first stage of separatio, and particularly in Hegel’s further
point that negation, as a form of death, gives rise to new insight: “Death, if that is what
we want to call this non-actuality, is of all things most dreadful … But the life of Spirit is
not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather
the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter
dismemberment, it finds itself” (19). As the lapis is a product of an initial separation and
dissolution, knowledge in Hegel’s system is only authentically born from the death
negation represents.
Hegel’s attempt to get at the prima materia of knowledge is indicative of the work
of the idealists in general because such a basic substance acts as a credible answer to
mechanism and, consequently, as affirmation of spiritual experience. Hegel’s friend and
colleague F.W.J. Schelling thus makes the same move in his philosophy of nature. In the
introduction to Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature, 6 which is an explicit reaction against
Newtonian mechanism, Schelling sees philosophy’s main purpose as looking beyond the
mechanism to explain why the laws of nature exist in the first place. He claims, “It is not
our task to portray such a system [of the mechanism of nature], once it exists, but rather
to find how such a system could exist at all” (181). Schelling is not satisfied with merely
pointing out cause and effect or the properties of matter; he wants to know what is behind
it all—what the cause of the cause is.
To illustrate this first cause, Schelling points out that the various parts of a
mechanism relate to the whole only through some common “higher principle,” which he
defines as spirit. For him, spirit “reciprocally relates the part and the whole, form and
6

First published in 1797 but significantly revised in 1803 to include more
Hermetic concepts. I use a translation from the 1803 edition.
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matter, each to the other.” “Thus,” he tells us, “you must concede that organization is
possible only in relation to a spirit” (191), the most basic substance of life. Furthermore,
Schelling associates the incorporeal representations of consciousness with spiritual
phenomena, and because philosophy for him is very much about the functions and role of
consciousness, he claims, “Philosophy is nothing other than a natural science of our
spirit” (189). His idea of true philosophy asks questions that lead to a harmonious
connection between empirical appearances and spiritual representations in the mind of
humans, for his philosophical science is the systematic mapping of the process of
consciousness: “We contemplate the system of our representations not in its being, but in
its becoming (189), thereby assuming, like Hegel, that self-consciousness inevitably
moves toward reconciliation and unity within a system of contradictions. Such a view
provides consciousness with an alchemical structure.
Schelling takes his philosophy of consciousness farther into alchemical territory
in his depiction of the consciousness’s self-objectification as a means to understanding
and growth, for he is ultimately concerned with how our minds absorb representations of
matter and then transform those representations into a spiritual or metaphysical
understanding of ourselves—in other words, how we distinguish ourselves from nature in
a way that leads to self-reflection. In order for consciousness to progress, he believes
man must become an object to himself for study and analysis: “As soon as man sets
himself in opposition to the external world…he takes the first step towards philosophy.
For with this separation reflection first begins […] by becoming his own object, he
separates himself from himself” (168-69). Such a separation of self-consciousness, like
Hegel’s separation of notions, is parallel to alchemy’s first step of separatio where the
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elements of a substance are divided. More significantly, as the alchemists projected the
work in their laboratory onto themselves, so that their personal refinement became their
“true” work, Schelling’s call for an objectification of self is also an alchemical work.
Man becomes the substance in the alembic, and his higher consciousness the hoped for
philosopher’s stone.
Such an alchemical reading of Schelling would be consistent with his personal
allegiances, according to Magee, who shows how Schelling’s writings contain overt
Hermeticism and alchemy, something that is not surprising given the esoteric
environment of late eighteenth-century Germany. Magee describes the youth of
Schelling and Hegel in Wurttemberg as occurring very much within a Hermetic milieu,
with both reading mystical works by Bohme, Oetinger, Robert Fludd, and Paracelsus
(70). Oetinger is the most dominant influence for Schelling, according to Magee,
because his father owned Oetinger’s books. He also had two uncles with close personal
ties to Oetinger (80). In fact, Magee relates how Schelling borrowed the tendency of
Oetinger to coin words from the Latin essentia to come up with the term Essentification.
Such a tendency on Oetinger’s part derives from his descriptions of “the unfolding of the
potentialities of a thing as made possible by its spirit,” which he often compared to the
alchemical process (80). Schelling’s imitation of Oetinger suggests that his alchemy is
not accidental—not a vague saturation of common themes and tropes with no knowledge
of where they came from—but a willful appropriation. I suggest the same can be said for
the other transcendentalists who take part in an alchemical discourse.
The Transcendental Genius
The idealists’ philosophy of spirit and its role in self-consciousness and
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knowledge served not as a mere influence on Romantic writers in England and America,
but as a foundation for their aesthetic models. Authors, as artists, saw themselves and
their work as particularly relevant to the time period’s celebration of the spiritual, for, as
Kant proclaimed, art links humans to an a priori morality. The work of an artist, then,
according to transcendental philosophy, is to promote moral knowledge.
The concept of genius is the most significant aesthetic theory to arise from the
morality of transcendental philosophy. While Kant and his German successors were not
the first to articulate a theory of genius, their transcendental version, with its direct line to
the supersensible and noumenal realm, resonated with the Romantic assertion that
experience beyond the empirical is real and legitimate. In The Critique of Judgment,
Kant defines genius as a “talent” or “natural endowment,” an “innate mental
predisposition” that comes directly from nature (174). Kant further explains genius in
terms of Spirit, which, “in an aesthetic sense,” is “the animating principle in the mind”
(181-82). In fact, he points out that the word genius comes from Latin and means “the
guardian and guiding spirit that each person is given as his own at birth” (175). Spirit in
the Kantian sense is a supersensible concept, which means it both originates and is
experienced outside of the bodily senses. Genius, then, is an intuition that posits a
transcendental purposiveness.
This spiritual, purposive intuition thereby depicts the artist as a mystic. Kant
explains that the artist himself “does not know how he came by the ideas for [his product
of genius]” because genius works as nature does, with its own inexplicable rules and
principles (175). Thus, an artist cannot see or understand the source of his originality,
for, as Kant explains, “no Homer or Wieland can show how his ideas, rich in fancy and
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yet also in thought, arise and meet in his mind; the reason is that he himself does not
know, and hence also cannot teach it to anyone else” (177). In this sense, genius is an
ineffable gift.
Schelling’s 1800 treatise on art, “Deduction of a Universal Organ of Philosophy,
or Main Propositions of the Philosophy of Art According to Principles of Transcendental
Idealism,” also describes the artist in mystical terms. He explains that art proves the
existence of spirit—that art is a material form of spirit—because it manifests a power the
artist is subject to while in the act of creativity. This power defines “the fateful man” as
subject to “an incomprehensible destiny,” which then “sets him apart from all other
men.” Such a destiny “compels” the artist “to express or represent things he does not
himself fully see through and whose meaning is infinite” (207). Like Kant, Schelling
believes art can never fully be learned or taught, or “attained by practice or in any other
way, but can only be inborn by the free gift of nature” (208). Accordingly, “the basic
character of the work of art is thus an unconscious infinity” (209).
This unconsciousness in the production of a work of art is the mystical element to
the theories of genius that use Spirit as their explanatory principle, but unconsciousness is
only half the equation. Schelling’s model of genius maintains that a work of art is a
conscious reworking of the raw material that comes from the unconscious inspiration.
Both the unconscious and the conscious, incorporating objectivity and subjectivity
respectively, must work together for a product of genius to be produced. For Schelling,
this combination of the two is a contradiction, for he associates the objective with
determinism and the subjective with free will, yet, he asserts, the final product of art
reconciles this contradiction through the fact that beauty does exist in art and that both its
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inspiration and creation is often inexplicable. Art, then, is derived not solely from
unconsciousness or consciousness but by the combination of both. Schelling explains,
“either without the other has no value and only the two in conjunction can bring forth the
highest” (208). Schelling’s theory of art as a site of conjunction is an alchemical model
of creativity, and his and Kant’s establishment of spirit as the ineffable instrument for
inspiration serves as a significant backdrop for further alchemical formulations of genius
and the creative process.
Alchemy and Transcendental Literature
As the list of authors in the opening paragraph suggests, much can be done to map
and analyze alchemy as an artifact of Romantic literature, for many Romantic writers
employ alchemy in their writing to varying degrees. In “Endymion,” for example, Keats
describes the euphoria of a transcendent love as a “fellowship with essence” (line 780) in
which Endymion and Cynthia are “fully alchemiz’d” (781). Endymion himself is an
emblem of eternal youth and immortality, while his dreams of Cynthia may be read as an
allegory of the pursuit for idealized beauty that originates from poetic visions. Another
example is Poe, for whom Clack provides an extensive survey of alchemical imagery and
allegory in his fiction and poetry. 7 According to Clack, alchemy held the potential for
Poe to find his “way back to a vision of nature” (64), which in turn “would provide a
solution to the cultural decay Poe saw around him” as a result of Newtonian
demythologization. As Clack’s interpretations suggest, Poe associated alchemy with the
power of individual regeneration, but more particularly with the role of “art and the artist
as mediators in the process” (65).

7

See The Marriage of Heaven and Earth, Chapter 4.
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Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein contains an explicit relationship between alchemy
and creation, with the product of an alchemical creation residing within the gothic
sublime. Frankenstein’s creature is frightening and dangerous, but the terror
Frankenstein experiences from his creation also moves him toward a higher level of selfknowledge. Interestingly, alchemy in this novel represents the possibility of human
knowledge to overstep traditional scientific boundaries, while at the same time it is
presented as a threatening science of the dark past, associated with forbidden mysteries
that tread on God’s domain. As a trope of creation within this context, Shelley examines
an underside to alchemy’s promises, where the works of genius may escape the control of
the creator. Such implications of God-like power resound with the moral obligations
Romantic writers felt in their role as poet-prophets.
While Shelley’s, Poe’s, and Keats’s use of alchemy is related to issues that also
inform Coleridge’s and Hawthorne’s writing, I believe the latter two authors have a more
specific relationship to transcendental philosophy and its aesthetic model of creativity.
They both formulated their models of creative process and products in terms of
alchemical transformation in order to meet transcendental moral demands. In the
following two chapters, then, I discuss their alchemical formulations of the creative
process within the concerns of this transcendental conversation.
Coleridge and Hawthorne see both a literary work and the method that created it
as emblems of an alchemical transformation. Two significant implications arise from this
formulation. First, while these artists recognized and regretted their own limitations in
their role as an alchemist-poet, it would be a mistake for us to overlook the high idealism
they labored under, for it was their (materialist) limitations that made affirmation of the
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spiritual and transcendental necessary. Significantly, alchemy was a safe discourse for
them to negotiate the tension between the spiritual ideal and material inhibitions because
its ideology makes room for contradictions. An ability to negotiate contradictions is, I
suggest, an important aspect of the genius model from which Coleridge and Hawthorne
shaped their own identities as writers.
Second, these writers show an awareness of an indifferent and even hostile
audience to the transformational work art is meant to perform, especially as that work is
threatened by an increasingly materialistic world. Coleridge’s poet-narrator of “Kubla
Khan” and Hawthorne’s Owen Warland exist in tension with an unsympathetic audience
to both art and the process in which it is created. For Hawthorne, art is threatened by a
utilitarian ethic of society but also, as Coleridge portrays as well, additional threats come
from the demands of daily life and the mortal limitations of the artist himself. Rather
than abandon art as useless or hopeless, though, these artists turn their art inward. If
society ignores art’s transformative powers, the artist will and must partake of it,
especially as an artist’s experience with transcendental origins provides access to
valuable knowledge. On one level, then, using alchemy as a model of creativity reveals a
deeply personal agenda on the part of transcendental artists, for alchemy is indeed a
deeply personal philosophy.
I have chosen Coleridge and Hawthorne, in part, because of their different
nationalities in order to show the transnational points of contact between transcendental
authors as they incorporate alchemical imagery in their texts. Coleridge’s inclusion here
will not be surprising because his writings and philosophy have often been portrayed as
mystical. Critics have largely overlooked his use of alchemy, however, which I offer as a
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means to not only understand his conceptualization of the creative process, but to
recognize the avenues of complexity alchemy made place for in his system of thought.
My choice of Hawthorne as a representative of transcendentalism may seem unlikely
since the prevailing critical opinion is that he was skeptical of its philosophy. His
pervasive use of alchemy in his fiction, though, suggests to me otherwise. In particular,
his use of esoteric alchemy in “Artist of the Beautiful” aligns him with the transcendental
philosophers, who take from alchemy to find a spiritual discourse best suited to their need
to counter the implications of a purely mechanistic nature. His well-established
investment in the spiritual is thus enacted through his ubiquitous alchemical tropes.
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CHAPTER 2
ALCHEMICAL TRANSFORMATION AND COLERIDGE’S CREATIVE GENIUS
In Mystery and Manners, Flannery O’Connor asserts that successful writers are
born with a gift. She says, “There is no excuse for anyone to write fiction for public
consumption unless he has been called to do so by the presence of a gift” (81). She
furthers this claim with the advice that anyone who is not born with this gift should forget
about becoming a writer: “The ability to create life with words is essentially a gift. If you
have it in the first place, you can develop it; if you don’t have it, you might as well forget
it” (88). Such a view on writing is the legacy of the ideal poet-prophet, called to write
beautiful and brilliant words that will lead humankind toward their inevitable perfection.
The idea of a poet-prophet has been long-reaching and compelling, for many people still
see imaginative writing, when it is done well, as a natural-born talent rather than a skill
that can be learned and developed. The transcendental literary writers of the Romantic
time period especially helped to popularize such ideals through their theories of genius.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge is one such writer who expounds on imaginative genius
in the context of transcendental philosophy, and his theories are specifically informed by
the German transcendental philosophers. As one of the primary texts of Romantic
principles on imagination and writing, his Biographia Literaria presents the poet as one
who has been endowed with divine capabilities because he possesses a higher
consciousness that allows him to take in a more comprehensive view of material and
metaphysical reality. This higher consciousness results in a better grasp of symbols and
their role within poetry. For Coleridge, poetry’s power resides in its transformative
potential, which is accomplished through the reconciliation of contradictions within the
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poem and within the composition process itself. Not surprisingly, he images this
transformation with alchemy, thereby imbuing his genius with the spiritual idealism such
a philosophy portrays.
Coleridge knew of alchemy not only generally as part of the German
philosophical tradition, but he read alchemical texts himself. In Ralph J. Coffman’s
Coleridge’s Library: A Bibliography of Books Owned or Read by Samuel Taylor
Coleridge is listed such well-known alchemists as Paracelsus, Kenelm Digby, and Robert
Fludd, as well as mystics who based their worldview on alchemical principles such as
Jacob Bohme and Emmanuel Swedenborg. Indeed, Coleridge proclaims his “feeling of
gratitude” (231) to Bohme in Chapter IX of Biographia Literaria: “Why need I be afraid?
Say rather how dare I be ashamed of the Teutonic theosophist, Jacob Behmen?” (229). In
addition, Molly Lefebure describes Coleridge’s fascination with chemistry, which he
considered to be the “practical end” of alchemy and part of a “divine scheme” (87).
Accordingly, she points out that he held alchemy in high esteem, calling it those “darling
studies” and associating it with religion and philosophy (88).
Lefebure also explains how Coleridge had planned in the late 1790s to write an
epic poem in the same tradition as Goethe’s Faust (a poem recognized for its pervasive
alchemy), in which Michael Scott, an “alchemical-philosopher” (88) acted as the
protagonist. Scott had lived during medieval times and was an alleged sorcerer. As the
hero in Coleridge’s poem, he would have followed the same path as Faust, setting aside
the religious and spiritual characteristics of alchemy to learn the magical arts that would
bring him fame and power. In the end, Scott would have defeated the Devil he had
conjured and rejected his magical alchemy in favor of a religious one that emphasizes
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“God’s grace” (89). While Coleridge never wrote the poem, the notes he kept about such
ideas illustrates his intent to explore the various sides of alchemy in his writing.
Despite Coleridge’s conscious use of alchemy as a literary device, however, he
was actually reluctant to accept some of the more radical alchemical elements found in
the mystical writers he perused, as is illustrated by what he called Bohme’s “ignorance of
rational psychology” (Biographia 229). Indeed, Coleridge embraced the concepts of
alchemy but not some of its eccentric imagery and language that would have seemed
outlandish to a post-Enlightenment sensibility (perhaps images of an incestual union or
urine and feces as base elements would be pertinent examples). Therefore, Coleridge’s
alchemy is more subtle than what existed in earlier alchemy because it lacks many
fantastical images, thereby reflecting the influence reason had on the evolving modern
mind. Coleridge did not seem, though, to moderate alchemy’s basic precepts of paradox,
reconciliation, and transformation since he incorporates them into his own poetic
structures.
An important poetic structure for Coleridge that incorporates alchemy is his
model of the creative process expounded in Biographia Literaria. “Kubla Khan” has
been read widely as an illustration of this imaginative process, and, as such, scholars have
explained the poem in terms of reconciliation between opposing elements, such as the
“sunny pleasure-dome” and the “caves of ice.” My reading of the poem coincides with
this more traditional interpretation, but I add the further insight of alchemy as the
underwriting philosophy behind the model itself. Understanding alchemy’s role in
Coleridge’s model of genius is important for another reason, though. More recent
criticism of the poem leans away from the straightforward theory/application model of
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Coleridge’s aesthetic vision. Instead, many critics regard the poem as an indication of
Coleridge’s frustration with that model, claiming that Kubla is a failed and futile poet.
This kind of criticism is largely a result of a close reading of the prefatory note attached
to the poem as well as of the puzzling last stanza depicting poetic deferment and
rejection. Indeed, the argument that “Kubla Khan” posits the limitations to poetic genius
is a compelling one. But the argument that the poem celebrates genius is compelling as
well. Is it possible that the poem does both? I find a valid response to this question in
the alchemical discourse Coleridge calls upon to explain his creative process. As a site of
contradictions and their negotiations, alchemy gives place to both an ideal and its
limitations, especially in its earlier stages of liminal exchange.
I
Coleridge’s formulation of the poet-prophet is a transcendental one, and it
particularly parallels claims F. W. J. Schelling makes about creative genius. Like
Schelling, who portrays an artist as standing “apart from all other men” (207), Coleridge
portrays genius as residing at a higher level of consciousness than the common man.
Indeed, his definition of genius aligns closely to Schelling’s formulations of mystical
inspiration, by calling it the “highest and intuitive knowledge” and, quoting Wordsworth,
“the vision and the faculty divine” (285). In Chapter XII of Biographia Literaria,
Coleridge likens consciousness to a mountain range and the view of the horizon this
mountain range presents to humans. He describes the common consciousness as limited
in both its view and its understanding of the presented boundaries, with fear of the
unknown stopping them from going any further than what they are comfortable with. He
says,
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The first range of hills, that encircle the scanty vale of human life, is the
horizon for the majority of its inhabitants. On its ridges the common sun is
born and departs. From them the stars rise, and touching them they vanish.
By the many, even this range, the natural limit and bulwark of the vale, is but
imperfectly known. Its higher ascents are too often hidden by mists and
clouds from uncultivated swamps, which few have courage or curiosity to
penetrate. To the multitude below these vapours appear, now as the dark
haunts of terrific agents, on which none may intrude with impunity. (284)
Many people with this “common” perspective see this vista as “the splendid palaces of
happiness and power” because they cannot or will not comprehend anything beyond. But
there are those who are not satisfied with the common perspective, and they are the few
who have a natural capacity for a higher consciousness. “In all ages,” Coleridge claims,
“there have been a few, who measuring and sounding the rivers of the vale at the feet of
their furthest inaccessible falls have learnt, that the sources must be far higher and far
inward; a few, who even in the level streams have detected elements, which neither the
vale itself or the surrounding mountains contained or could supply” (284). This image
illustrates the Romantic concept of poet-prophet, one who is capable, even called, to test
the depths of origins and knowledge.
Against this backdrop of a mystical genius, Coleridge further expounds his theory
in terms of primary and secondary functions, with an important distinction being that the
secondary “coexist[s] with the conscious will” (313)—in other words, with a subjective
will—while the primary coexists with an unconscious, objective will. The primary
imagination, Coleridge explains, is “the living power and prime agent of all human
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perception, […] a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite
I AM” (313). The “Eolian Harp” illustrates the kind of intuition a poet receives from the
primary imagination. In this poem Coleridge describes “the one life within us and
abroad” (line 26) as the vehicle for his own imaginative musings as a poet. The third
stanza describes him “on the midway slope / Of yonder hill” (34-35) where he stretches
for an afternoon rest. Through “half-closed eyelids” he envisions “sunbeams danc[ing]”
and “idle flitting phantasies” that come to his mind through little or no effort on his part,
for, he says, “full many a thought uncalled and undetained … Traverse my indolent and
passive brain” (36-41). He is a poet who merely needs to find quiet and tranquility so
that an “intellectual breeze” may pass through his mind, providing the imaginative scenes
that he may turn into poetry. Such is the image of the classic Romantic poet: he passively
receives raw imaginings from a supersensible source, which he then crafts into art.
But the key word here is “craft,” for the process of creation is more complex for
Coleridge, just as it is for Schelling, than just simple, objectively-derived visions. The
unconsciousness needs a consciousness, and Coleridge provides that in the form of the
secondary imagination. The secondary imagination is very much like the primary
imagination in that it exists as a replica or “echo” of the primary, “identical” with it in the
type of duties it must fulfill, but it differs “in degree, and in the mode of its operation”
(313). The secondary imagination is the resource a poet calls upon in his conscious
crafting of a poem. Thus, after receiving the vision or organic inspiration from the
primary imagination, the poet then uses the secondary imagination to form this raw
material into a linguistic state that may be shared as a work of art, for, as Coleridge
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explains, the secondary imagination “dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create”
(313).
Coleridge’s model of creative genius is similar to Schelling’s in that he also sees
creativity as an act of reconciliation. Just as Schelling claims that “the whole productive
drive comes to rest with the completion of the product; all contradictions are resolved, all
riddles unraveled” (205), Coleridge sees the natural capacity of the artist in “diffus[ing] a
tone, and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses each into each, by the
synthetic and magical power, to which we have exclusively appropriated the name of
imagination” (319). This power, Coleridge goes on to explain, is revealed through the
ability of a poet to reconcile “opposite or discordant qualities,” of which he names
several, among them “sameness with difference,” “general with concrete,” “the
individual, with the representative,” the novel or fresh with the “old and familiar, and
“self-possession” with “feeling profound or vehement.” It creates a feeling of unity as it
“blends and harmonizes the natural and the artificial” (319). The power of the poet, then,
is to create a feeling of wellness with the world, to negotiate discordant or competing
elements in favor of a vision of the world as ultimately whole and at peace, if not
immediately so.
This power of poetry to reconcile is Coleridge’s first step toward an alchemical
model of the imagination, and parallel to this ideal of reconciliation is the ideal of poetry
as an embodiment of transformation. While on one level Coleridge’s system of the
imagination may be seen as merely a translation process from the primary vision to the
secondary linguistic symbols and images, he specifically describes the processes of the
poetic imagination as transformational, and, crucially, alchemy serves as the central
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image for this transformational process. In Chapter XIV, immediately following his
explanation of the reconciling power of the poet through the imagination, Coleridge
provides an illustration of how this reconciliation actually works in the composition of
poetry by borrowing the alchemical imagery of a poem written by Sir John Davies. The
poem’s name is “Of the Soule of Man and the Immortalitie Thereof,” and it was written
in 1599, during the height of alchemy’s popularity in Western culture. The poem was
originally meant to be about the soul, but Coleridge prompts his readers to apply it to
poetic imagination. It reads:
Doubtless this could not be, but that she turns
Bodies to spirit by sublimation strange,
As fire converts to fire the things it burns,
As we our food into our nature change.

From their gross matter she abstracts their forms,
And draws a kind of quintessence from things;
Which to her proper nature she transforms
To bear them light, on her celestial wings.

Thus does she, when from individual states
She doth abstract the universal kinds;
Which then re-clothed in divers names and fates
Steal access through our senses to our minds. (319)
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Apart from the clear alchemical vocabulary of this poem, such as “sublimation,”
“quintessence,” “transforms,” and “celestial wings,” its ideas also clearly exhibit
alchemical ideology. All three stanzas describe the same process: the transformation of
material, sensory experiences or matter (“bodies,” “gross matter,” and “individual
states”) into spiritual visions from which the most essential and “universal” knowledge
(i.e. “quintessence”) may be abstracted. In an alchemical laboratory, sublimation is the
process of distilling a substance until its vapor rises, and it represents the transformation
from a material to a spiritual state, which is often symbolized by a winged creature flying
heavenward (in the poem, “her celestial wings”). This poem illustrates for Coleridge
creative sublimation: the poetic imagination goes from bodily sensations to spiritual
visions, from which the most pure and essential knowledge may be abstracted, “reclothed” in a material, sensory form such as a poem, and then recognized intellectually as
a priori knowledge. Such a process is alchemical especially as it allows for the
contradictory elements of spirit and matter to work through each other.
Another alchemical element to the poem is its circular stages: it begins and ends
with the material. But the final position rests at an elevated state in which transcendental
knowledge has been achieved. Within the framework of Hermetic influences, M. H.
Abrams describes “a distinctive figure of Romantic thought and imagination—the
ascending circle, or spiral” (184). The image of a spiral includes both the original point
of consciousness and its ascent to a higher state, thereby “fus[ing] the idea of the circular
return with the idea of linear progress” (184). As with most alchemical images, the spiral
unites contradictory ideas, which also coincides with the power of reconciliation
Coleridge gives to poets. The poet who achieves such a fusion, according to Coleridge’s
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model, then, is an alchemist who combines spiritual inspiration and material realities and
then reduces them down to their most basic but necessary form of beauty. This
quintessence of beauty, a poem, is for Coleridge the sensory window to transcendental
truth—a type of philosopher’s stone.
The significance of alchemy as Coleridge’s model of the imagination lies in the
power it gives the poet: poetic work resides in the realm of the divine where the poet has
the power to literally change his readers’ view of the world and, by so doing, take part in
the progression of humankind. In that sense, the poet-prophet serves as a mediator
between God and the common man. The poet who bears such responsibility has been
endowed with a higher consciousness than the common man and, as such, acts as an
initiated adept who is among the select few worthy of the higher knowledge. In this
sense, Coleridge’s poet-prophet may be seen as a Hermes figure. Just as Hermes
Trismegistus becomes a revered teacher to Tat and Asclepius because of his higher
knowledge, the persona of the Romantic poet is an esoteric sage. The poet is set off from
regular society because he is born with an innate ability to not only recognize but to use
the symbols of transformation.
II
Because “Kubla Khan” is seen as an allegory of Coleridge’s creative process that
involves the primary and secondary imagination, his reliance on alchemy for an image of
this process encourages a reconsideration of “Kubla Khan” that takes alchemy into
account. Few critics discuss Coleridge’s model of the creative process or “Kubla Khan”
in alchemical terms, even though the elements of that process, such as poetry’s power to
reconcile opposites as well as its transformative effects, clearly reside within alchemy’s
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domain. Irene Chayes, M.W. Rowe, and Kathleen Wheeler all recognize the poem as an
affirmation of Coleridge’s conciliatory ideals, particularly as those ideals are represented
through the different functions of the imagination, but Fred L. Milne takes this reading a
step closer to mine by briefly referencing alchemy as a possible context to “the basic
structural pattern of the Xanadu mind-landscape” (20). S.K. Heninger, Jr. provides the
most thorough alchemical reading by employing C. G. Jung’s theory of individuation, of
which alchemy is the central image for the conscious and unconscious functions. More
commonly, though, critics see Coleridge’s visionary poet in the context of a more generic
mysticism. Douglas Hedley, for example, uses “Kubla Khan” to illustrate Coleridge’s
place within the mystical tradition, suggesting that his theology is a Christianized version
of transcendentalism, of which having a vision of God is central (115-116).
In light of Coleridge’s alchemical model of the imagination, though, it would
make sense if “Kubla Khan,” as a poetic representation of that model, contains
alchemical elements as well. While it is not as exoterically alchemical as Davies’ poem,
in that it does not contain laboratory tropes or specialized alchemical vocabulary, its
imagery does set forth the hermetic philosophy of correspondences in which a microcosm
reflects the properties and characteristics of a macrocosm, or, as the Hermetica text “The
Emerald Table” explains, “That which is above is like to that which is below, and that
which is below is like to that which is above, to accomplish the miracles of one thing”
(Linden 28). Because the secondary imagination’s work of art reflects the primary’s
divine visions, hermetic correspondence is an apt image of their functions. “Kubla Khan”
enacts this correspondence through its imagery of organic and artificial operations.
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Furthermore, the sexual imagery of “Kubla Khan” is meant to represent the
organic creative processes of the primary imagination, and, I suggest, this sexual imagery
is an alchemical device that works alongside the trope of microcosmic/macrocosmic
correspondence. Alchemy is fraught with marriage and sexual symbolism because
inherent in the symbol of a marriage and its consummation is the concept of a union of
opposites. Eliade’s explanation of primitive man’s alchemical rituals and myths that
include an Earth-Mother illustrate the reasoning behind alchemy’s sexual imagery. This
“marriage of metals” and their accompanying sexual rituals are meant to symbolize, even
mirror, the divine creative process (37). As the early smiths saw their work as a replica
of the natural creation of earth, later alchemists also use imagery of the Earth-Mother and
her fertile womb to portray the correspondence of their own synthetic work to natural
processes.
This early alchemical mindset in which metallurgical work corresponds to a
divine creation complements Coleridge’s model of creativity as imaged in “Kubla Khan.”
The first vision of the poem, which recounts Kubla’s construction of a pleasure-dome
adjacent to a tumultuous chasm, employs sexual imagery within nature, with a woman’s
reproductive anatomy serving as an image of the landscape. There is a “green hill” in
which a “deep romantic chasm” lays “athwart a cedarn cover” (lines 12-13). The color
green is an obvious symbol for fertility and life, while the chasm and cedarn cover
describe the place of entry into the womb. The womb itself is reflected in the “caverns
measureless to man” (4). In essence, then, the chasm and the caverns represent nature,
where the creative act occurs macrocosmically. The earth is personified by a woman
wailing for her lover and continues with her breathing “in fast thick pants” and “with
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ceaseless turmoil seething” (17-18). A fountain then “momently was forced,” from
which “huge fragments vaulted like rebounding hail” (19-21). The fountain, then, serves
as a personification of the orgasmic moment—the pinnacle of the chaos of this organic
process. The man and the woman are both represented in this scene, the ultimate union
of opposites. As such, the procreative act of nature symbolizes the creative act of the
primary imagination, described in Biographia Literaria as “the eternal act of creation in
the infinite I AM” (313).
In contrast to the primitive chaos of the caverns, the pleasure-dome is enclosed in
man-made order. It has the feel of an open, colorful, and pleasant place, almost like a
Garden of Eden, where the senses are at work. An important difference of the pleasuredome to the caverns lies in its geographical location: it is above ground where the sun
bathes it with light, thereby symbolizing the consciousness in its visible free will. In
contrast, the sunless sea and caves of ice exist in darkness and mystery, where the
unconscious does its ineffable work. Most significantly, the pleasure-dome is fashioned
by man: it is a mortal creation, whereas the caverns and their procreativity result from a
divine creation. Thus, the pleasure-dome is a representation of art in its final, material
form. What’s more, as an image of art, it is like the ores that the early smiths took from
the earth and on which they performed their synthetic work, which was in turn meant to
replicate nature’s work. Hence, the pleasure-dome and the caverns are reciprocally
mirrored to each other on the waves of the river: the waves carry the shadow of the dome
to the caves simultaneously as they carry the sounds from the cave. Hence, the
microcosmic pleasure-dome serves as a reflection of the macrocosmic caverns in the
same way that the secondary imagination, which is responsible for the “man-made”
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functions of the imagination, echoes the primary. Incidentally, water is set up as an
image of a visionary mirror in the preface to “Kubla Khan”: “And soon the fragments
dim of lovely forms / Come trembling back, unite, and now once more / The pool
becomes a mirror” (102).
An important element of the macrocosm/microcosm concept in alchemy is its
attempt to explain the origins of knowledge. As Nicholas Halmi explains, man as
microcosm “is capable of forming a mental image of the world,” and, consequently, can
“incorporate the macrocosm into itself, in the form of knowledge” (45). Similarly,
according to Coleridge’s model of imaginative genius, the significance of a primary
source of inspiration is that the poet has a direct line to absolute truth, which he can then
fashion in a poem as a priori knowledge. Such a system is what the alchemical poem by
Davies is meant to describe. Thus, while the “pleasure-dome” of “Kubla Khan” mirrors
the sexual act that incarnates the creative act, it also refers to a mystical pleasure of
knowledge. In the preface to Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth equates knowledge with
pleasure: “We have no knowledge, that is, no general principles drawn from the
contemplation of particular facts, but what has been built up by pleasure, and exists in us
by pleasure alone … knowledge is pleasure” (361). These statements are made in
connection with the role of the poet, which is chiefly to put the mind “in a state of
enjoyment” (362), but they also refer to the pleasure that comes from working through
more difficult concepts toward a final triumph of understanding. Such a process may be
done as a poet through the composition of a poem but also more significantly as a poetphilosopher who works through the “real and substantial action and suffering” of life
(361). Thus, knowledge as pleasure is the genuinely mystical reward of a true work of
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genius. If the pleasure-dome is a mirrored image of the caverns, it is so by way of what
the transformation from organic to man-made creativity eventually leads to—the pleasure
of a priori knowledge that originates in the organic transcendental realm.
This relationship between the dome and the caverns may appear at first to be
linear; however, the river with its “mazy motion” suggests a more cyclical model.
Warren Stevenson describes the river in “Kubla Khan” as returning to the fountain after
its path through the sunless sea, thereby depicting the ancient symbol of the serpent with
the tail in its mouth (609). The tail-eating serpent, or uroboros, is a common alchemical
image, and it represents, according to Jolande Jacobi, “the hermetic alchemistic
transmutation process and symbol of eternity, time, etc.” (149). Coleridge uses this
symbol elsewhere to illustrate the discerning power of poetic genius. In an 1815 letter to
Joseph Cottle he writes:
The common end of all narrative, nay, of all, Poems is to convert a series
into a Whole: to make those events, which in real or imagined History
move on in a strait Line, assume to our Understandings a circular
motion—the snake with it’s Tail in its Mouth […] what to our short sight
appears strait is but a part of the great Cycle—just as the calm Sea to us
appears level, tho’ it be indeed only a part of a globe. Now what the
Globe is in Geography, miniaturing in order to manifest the Truth, such is
a Poem to the Image of God. (Beer 99)
When read alchemically, then, the cyclical river in “Kubla Khan” illustrates first the
circular nature of correspondences. The poet begins with the macrocosm of “that which
is above” and also ends there, accomplishing the wholeness represented by a circle. The
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cyclical river also illustrates the transformational stages of the poetic genius: the process
of the imagination leads to a product of art earned through the cyclical exchange between
the primary and secondary functions. Both this process and the product embody an
affinity to truth.
III
Coleridge’s alchemical model of creative transformation is quite idealistic,
accentuating what was at least conceptually feasible for poets. But as Seamus Perry has
noted, there exists in Coleridge “a tenacious realism persisting alongside the growing
sway of his idealism” (4-5). If the first and second visions of the poem represent the
idealism of Coleridge’s genius model, the poem’s prefatory note and ending stanza reveal
a realism that mitigates that idealism. The meaning of the preface attached to “Kubla
Khan” has been a source for much debate among critics,8 with more recent readings
viewing it as subverting the ideals found in the poem itself. At face value, the narrative
of the preface upholds Coleridge’s genius ideal. It portrays an Author as a passive
receptacle of a vision “in which the images rose up before him as things, with a parallel
production of the correspondent expressions, without any sensation or consciousness of

8

Beginning with Elisabeth Schneider’s Coleridge, Opium, and Kubla Khan, the
preface has come under scrutiny as a fiction. Schneider believes the note is an attempt to
hide Coleridge’s “notorious” inability to finish many of the works he proposed to do,
with the subtitle “fragment” serving as self-justification (785). Other critics, such as
Rosemary Ashton and J. Robert Barth, also question, to varying degrees, Coleridge’s
claim that the poem is a result of a drug-induced dream. On the other hand, Alan
Richardson wonders how such a distrustful approach to Coleridge is warranted. He
doesn’t see any reason why we should not read the preface at face value; in fact, he
claims that the introductory note is probably one of Coleridge’s most honest pieces of
writing (15). For my own argument, I believe the most productive question is not
whether the preface describes the actual creation of the poem, i.e. whether the story of the
dream and its subsequent interruption is fictional or not, but whether its narrative sustains
the ideals Coleridge has set forth for the creative process.
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effort” (102). Upon regaining consciousness, he “eagerly” wrote down the poem
supposedly in the form we have it now. The Author, as a persona for Coleridge, here
experiences a clear moment of primary imagination similar to what he describes in “The
Eolian Harp,” where he is given, as a gift, the raw material, which he then arranges in a
poem through the function of his secondary imagination.
Significantly, Coleridge attempts to control how we read the poem by calling it a
fragment, which was a popular genre of his time. Anne Janowitz notes that Byron, Keats,
and Wordsworth all published poems as fragments in addition to Coleridge, and she also
points out that “Kubla Khan” was published with two other fragments by Coleridge,
“Christabel” and “The Pains of Sleep.” The fact that these poets, who were highly
competent writers, not only allowed unfinished poems to be published but then
emphasized their incompleteness indicates for Janowitz that the fragment as a poetic form
is noteworthy. I suggest the popularity of the fragment genre may be explained, at least
in part, by the parallel popularity of the theories of genius that these Romantic poets
espoused. If the poet is, in fact, receptive to visions through the unconscious or primary
imagination, a fragment such as “Kubla Khan” is an apt manifestation of those visions in
a form as close to the original as possible: it presents the unfinished and otherworldly
state of an authentic vision or “dream” before the secondary imagination takes over with
conscious revision. “Kubla Khan,” then, as a fragment, is a means for Coleridge to
display his intuitive gifts.
For Janowitz, however, a fragment signifies “a poetic unity somehow prematurely
stopped” (26-27) so that it represents not pure genius but a tension between what was
strived for and what was actually possible. The difficulty of translating a vision into
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language is an important barrier for Romantic poets, she contends, and the fragment
seeks to both justify and bemoan “the incommensurateness of vision and language” (31). 9
Janowitz’s argument is representative of what is now widely recognized by literary
historians: in addition to the ideals of unity and reconciliation, Romanticism “was built as
well from anxiety, frustration, and irresolution” (26). When “Kubla Khan” and its
preface are read in these terms, Coleridge’s alchemical ideals of transformation come into
question.
I believe the preface and the last stanza of the poem do possess a melancholic
tone that undermines, to a certain extent, the high idealism of its subject matter. In
addition, I do see how the poem as a fragment, by virtue of its unfinished state, could
posit the impossibility of obtaining high ideals. Indeed, the preface and the last stanza of
the poem reflect Coleridge’s awareness of his limitations as a poet as they portray
interruption, deferment, and rejection. In a letter to John Thelwall, written around the
same time as “Kubla Khan,” Coleridge expresses frustration with his inability to grasp
the infinite:
I can at times feel strongly the beauties you describe, in themselves, & for
themselves—but more frequently all things appear little—all the
knowledge, that can be acquired, child’s play—the universe itself—what
but an immense heap of little things?—I can contemplate nothing but
parts, & parts are all little—!—My mind feels as if it ached to behold &
9

It is relevant here to note that the recognition of language’s insufficiency to
capture visions in their original form is built into the genius model. Kant’s definition of
genius includes the impossibility to share it with others; he says, “no [determinate]
concept can be adequate” because “no language can express it completely and allow us to
grasp it” (182). Coleridge also admits that rendering visions into language is “arduous
work,” valuable but “difficult” and “rare” (Biographia 403).
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know something great—something one & indivisible and it is only in the
faith of this that rocks or waterfalls, mountains or caverns give me the
sense of sublimity or majesty! (Perry 132)
The “little things” Coleridge refers to reside within the material world and are
distractions from the more valuable “great” things of a mystical, divine realm. One
implication of the fragment as a visionary genre, then, is that a vision comes and goes
infrequently according to the material circumstances of the receiver. As the narrative in
the preface to “Kubla Khan” portrays, the Author’s vision is lost as a result of the “person
on business from Porlock” so that his vision is easily interrupted by worldly concerns;
once the vision is gone, the material it furnishes is not easily accessible. Coleridge
laments the easily-lost vision through the fragment poem he includes in the preface:
“Then all the charm / Is broken—all that phantom-world so fair / Vanishes, and a
thousand circlets spread, / And each mis-shape[s] the other.” Coleridge here recognizes
that because a poet lives in the real world, he is subject to its interruptions, transactions,
and petty concerns, so that the “charm” of the “phantom-world so fair” is random,
unsustainable, and easily forgotten.
Coleridge’s deferment of completing “what had been originally given to him” in
vision also questions his genius ideal. He tells us he has “frequently purposed to finish
for himself” the poem, but his quote from Theocritus (“I’ll sing a sweeter song
tomorrow”) coupled with his own words (“the to-morrow is yet to come”) portray him as
a mere man, lacking in the inspiration needed to finish the poem, rather than as a poetprophet. This delay is repeated in the last stanza of “Kubla Khan” through the wish
“Could I revive within me / Her symphony and song, … I would build that dome in the
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air” (lines 42-45, my emphasis). The poet’s voice here does not show what he can do and
has done, but rather what he would do if he could. Inherent in the label “fragment” is the
threat of imaginative sterility that accompanies a loss of vision.
What’s more, in the last stanza of the poem the “common” listeners reject the poet
and his poetry. Because a visionary experience is a privilege bestowed on a gifted few,
and because it is then difficult to put into language, the visions may be incomprehensible
to the “common” people who don’t possess the spiritual sensibilities that poets do. The
poet, then, is threatened with irrelevance: his visions may be useless—or at least,
perceived as useless, which amounts to the same thing—because they do not reside
within lived experience. Thus, “Kubla Khan” ends with a similar sentiment as that in
Chapter XII of Biographia Literaria, “Poor man! he is not made for this world” (285).
Interestingly, the scene at the end of the poem is not a depiction of what does happen but,
as the poet himself says, what should happen after his poetry becomes public. After
seeing the “sunny dome” and “caves of ice,” which represent his poetry, the poet
ironically advises, “all should cry, “Beware! Beware!”; they should “Weave a circle
round him thrice, / And close [their] eyes with holy dread” (47-49, my emphasis).
Because it is the poet speaking here and not actually the people who represent his
audience, we glimpse the self-consciousness he feels for the task his poetry is meant to
accomplish. He knows it will create upheaval and dismay. The poet-prophet is thus
threatened by his listeners because he in turn threatens them. The tone of the word
“should” is ironic, but perhaps it is even bitter for the obstinacy of the common
consciousness’s close-mindedness.
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The interruption, deferment, and rejection that make up the experience of the poet
in the preface and last stanza contrast significantly to the depiction of the poet in the first
stanza as a visionary sage who reveals a priori knowledge through poetry. One
explanation for this contrast could be that the poem is, indeed, a fragment, leaving
unfinished the final reconciliation of these contradictions. I find this explanation
somewhat plausible but not entirely in light of the crafted elements of the poem. 10
Another explanation, an increasingly common one, is that “Kubla Khan” is a poem about
failure, specifically the failure of a false poet. 11 But when the poem and the preface are
taken as a whole, the tone is not as despondent as failure would suggest. The second half
of the fragment poem quoted in the preface suggests Coleridge’s faith that someday the
vision will resume: “The stream will soon renew its smoothness, soon / The visions will
return! And lo! he stays, / And soon the fragments dim of lovely forms / Come trembling
back, unite, and now once more / The pool becomes a mirror” (102). If the poet of the
preface were entirely false, he would not be worthy of the vision when it returns. In
addition, Coleridge likely had the “rocks or waterfalls, mountains or caverns” of “Kubla

10

Anne Mellor provides a helpful description of the poem’s completed elements:
“On thematic and stylistic grounds, the poem is complete. The poem describes creative
process: the created product (the dome) is evoked, the sources of creativity celebrated,
the consequences of the creative act examined. Metrically, the poem moves full circle
from the regular prosody of the opening lines through the irregular prosody of the lines
describing the source and ending of life itself, back to the metrically regular lines
describing the source and ending of life itself, back to the metrically regular lines of the
closing description of the poet’s impact on his audience” (158).
11

David S. Hogsette, for example, believes critics are misguided when they read
the poem as an allegory of “imaginative redemption.” He claims the poem instead offers
a vision of poetic failure by “ultimately demonstrating that the ideal (pro)creative and
redemptive imagination lies beyond the grasp of the mortal poet, remaining an external
and unobtainable other” (par.2). See also Regina Hewitt, “The False Poets in ‘Kubla
Khan.’”
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Khan” in mind when he wrote his letter to Thelwall, since the poem and letter were
written around the same time. These landscapes are the source of Coleridge’s faith in
“something one & indivisible” because they “give me the sense of sublimity or majesty.”
Coleridge provides a clear hint here that his vision of Xanadu offers him hope in the face
of failure, not the failure itself.
Furthermore, “Kubla Khan” is juxtaposed as “a contrast” to “The Pains of Sleep,”
another fragment of the same volume (102). “The Pains of Sleep” describes visions “Of
shapes and thoughts that tortured me” (121), which conjured a “desire with loathing
strangely mixed / On wild or hateful objects fixed” (122). Besides the distinct difference
in word choice and theme between the two poems, Coleridge himself makes it clear that
the two fragments are of a “very different character” (103), suggesting that “Kubla Khan”
is meant to portray a more positive visionary experience. Thus, when the idealistic
elements of “Kubla Khan” are considered alongside the long-standing critical
interpretation of a correspondence between the first vision of the poem and the
description of poetic genius in Biographia Literaria, we can be assured that the poem is
not entirely about failure. However, we are still left wondering how the alchemical ideal
of poetic transformation and reconciliation can withstand the obvious depictions of poetic
limitations in the poem.
Mellor’s concept of romantic irony at first seems to reconcile the genius ideal
with its limitations as they both exist in “Kubla Khan.” The romantic ironist, she says,
begins from skepticism, where he “must acknowledge the inevitable limitations of his
own finite consciousness and of all man-made structures or myths” (5). But even in the
midst of his skepticism, the romantic ironist will also “affirm and celebrate the process of
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life by creating new images and ideas” (5). This affirmation of creation results from the
romantic investment in becoming, in a continual process and action. As part of this
becoming, Mellor contends “many central romantic works exhibit a structure that is
deliberately open-ended and inconclusive” (6), so that an inherent characteristic of
romantic irony is “unstructured openness” (6). The reason for this open-ended structure
is to allow for symbols to be posited, challenged, and then rejected, from which new
symbols arise for the same process. Romantic irony is, then, a process of artistic
becoming, rather than one moment of absolute articulation.
Mellor further distinguishes the romantic ironist from “modern deconstructors”
through the ironist’s affirmation and celebration of life, noting that “modern
deconstructionists choose to perform only one half of the romantic-ironic operation, that
of skeptical analysis and determination of the limits of human language and
consciousness” (5). In contrast, the romantic ironist possesses as much “enthusiasm” as
skepticism, so that both sides of the ironic coin are grasped and negotiated. Mellor’s
depiction of romantic irony is reminiscent of alchemical paradox as alchemy brings
together opposing elements in a dialectical relationship. In alchemy, the base earth is as
necessary as the divine heavens, and it is through the conjunction of both that purification
can happen. “Kubla Khan,” with its alchemical ideals competing against threats of
failure, would fit nicely within Mellor’s concept of romantic irony, for the antithetical
elements would find place in alchemy’s dialectical ideology.
However, Coleridge exemplifies for Mellor a “negative” response to romantic
irony (137). In “Kubla Khan,” the “antithetical forces” of “a unifying imagination” on
one side and “mortality, self-doubt, social respectability, and rational understanding” on
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the other are, she contends, deliberately left unreconciled (155). The reason for this
irresolution is that Coleridge could not reconcile an “underlying chaos” with “the
absolute validity of an ordered Christian universe,” even though he “desperately” wanted
to do so (137). As a result, his writings are imbued with “guilt-ridden ambivalence”
(137).
But Mellor’s bracketing of Coleridge as an exception to the more positive aspects
of romantic irony may well be an oversimplification of Coleridge’s relationship with
complexity. Seamus Perry describes Coleridge’s use of oppositions as a type of
“muddle,” by which Perry does not mean a confused or intellectually-confounded state,
but one in which complexity is acknowledged and embraced. He quotes from William
Empson to explain “muddle” further: “In a celebrated note to a poem […] Empson
described life as a matter of maintaining oneself between positions, equally attractive or
necessary but irresolvable; and elsewhere: ‘Extremely often, in dealing with the world,
one arrives at two ideas or ways of dealing with things which both work and are needed,
but which entirely contradict one another” (9). Accordingly, Perry endows Coleridge
with the same kind of muddled intellect: seeing the validity in opposing truths, Coleridge
tries to make room in his mind for both. Perry quotes a passage from a letter in which
Coleridge makes the point for himself: “In all subjects of deep and lasting Interest you
will detect a struggle between two opposites, two polar Forces, both of which are alike
necessary to our human Well-being, & necessary each to the continued existence of the
other” (12). Truth for Coleridge, then, according to Perry’s claims, resides in a liminal
space, where negotiation between affirmation and negation is a constant process.
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By virtue of its in-between position, a liminal space offers the best potential for
transformation because it allows a broad view of multiple perspectives. Alchemy, in that
sense, is a liminal discourse as it exists in Romantic idealism. Its end goals would take a
poet to the realm of absolutes if it could, but the preliminary steps toward that goal are a
relative cycle of thesis and antithesis converging and repelling as they seek to overcome
their oppositions. By virtue of the post-Enlightenment scientific mindset that disposed of
the more fantastical elements of alchemy, the romantics were quite realistic in
acknowledging their weaknesses and limitations as fallen human beings, and as such,
they consciously resided in the (pre)liminary stages of the quest for perfection. Although
the idealists’ appeal for perfection is emphatic, an awareness of perfection’s
impossibilities resides within its conceptualization. Thus, Fichte proclaims that man’s
“true vocation … lies in endless approximation toward” perfection, at the same time as
he acknowledges, “It is part of the concept of man that his ultimate goal be unobtainable
and that his path thereto be infinitely long. Thus it is not man’s vocation to reach this
goal” (9). In Coleridge, the presence of the alchemical ideal of genius alongside the
frank recognition of its limitations is much like the attitude of alchemy in general: the
alchemists knew the high odds against the actual discovery of the philosopher’s stone, but
the stages leading up to that ideal offered their own rewards.
The (pre)liminary stages of alchemy include, by necessity, a mixture of
perspectives, since contradictions must first be present for an ultimate reconciliation to
take place. As a discourse of reconciliation, then, alchemy gives place to disunity,
fragmentation, and failure and to unity, wholeness, and success; it gives place for both
the grand ideals of redemptive creativity and for the underlying melancholy that comes
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from the realization of the impossibility of that redemption in its perfect state. In short, it
provides a space to “muddle” through complexity. As Jung points out, “an awareness of
the two sides of man’s personality is essential” if one is to partake of the transformative
powers of alchemy. Grounding his poetic ideals in the process of alchemy (as embodied
through “a fragment”), rather than in a final, finished product, allows Coleridge to openly
portray its impossibilities alongside its possibilities. The presence of interruptions,
deferments, and rejections within a poem about creative genius is entirely consistent with
the alchemical ideology it enacts.
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CHAPTER 3
HAWTHORNE’S TRANSCENDENTAL ALCHEMIST
In 1837, Ralph Waldo Emerson presented “An American Scholar” in which he
makes a call for Americans to be confident and self-trusting in the face of European
culture that had so far dominated arts and letters. This self-trust is based on a
Neoplatonic doctrine of the “Divine Soul” (59) that “animates all men” (56), which
provides a transcendental model for the American Scholar to be guided by intuition: “if
the single man plant himself indomitably on his instincts, and there abide, the huge world
will come round to him” (59). Like other transcendentalists, such as Schelling and
Coleridge, Emerson sees the mind of a scholar as an alembic in which material
experience changes into truth as it passes through. A scholar receives “into him the
world around” in the same way Coleridge’s poet receives an “intellectual breeze” of the
primary imagination from which he crafts a poem by virtue of the secondary imagination.
This “theory of books” Emerson calls “transmuting life into truth” and likens it to a
“distillation” (46) and a transfiguration (50). It is through this alchemical intellectualism
that Emerson believes American artists may overcome “the sluggard intellect of this
continent” and will “fill the postponed expectation of the world with something better
than the exertions of mechanical skill” (43). On one level, Emerson is speaking about the
individual and his own inner life, but on another important level, he is speaking to the
potential artists of the nation, pleading with them to embrace transcendental precepts so
that their art may be imbued with the kind of beauty he believes only comes from a
supersensible origin.
Such is the call that Nathaniel Hawthorne attempts to answer in his work as a
fictional artist—and especially as an artist who posits creative production within a

Brocious 56
transcendental and alchemical framework, for even though his use of alchemy in his
fiction is not always straightforward, Hawthorne does characterize several artistic figures
as alchemists. There has been much discussion among critics regarding Hawthorne’s
representations of artists, and these discussions invariably lead to his relationship with
transcendentalism. Notwithstanding his friendship with Emerson and other American
transcendentalists, Hawthorne is generally considered a skeptic of the transcendental
project, for his realism is seen as a check on the idealism of his friends. The Blithedale
Romance is particularly viewed as a skeptical look at transcendentalism and its material
manifestations of utopian communities. But while Miles Coverdale portrays a detached
onlooker of Brook Farm rather than an integral member and believer of the community,
he remains throughout the book in close proximity to the transcendental society. Such is
the position Hawthorne seems to take toward transcendentalism generally: he is
fascinated by it at the same time he is vocally skeptical of it.
I believe the spiritual discourse of transcendental philosophy held great interest
for Hawthorne, so that he could not dismiss it altogether, even if its material practices did
not appeal to him. Most critics acknowledge that Hawthorne was deeply invested in the
spiritual and that he actively wrote against the materialism of post-Newtonian
empiricism. Because the transcendental project was also formed as a reaction against
mechanistic philosophy, Hawthorne’s investment in the spiritual reveals an important
shared interest with his transcendental associates. Additionally, a significant intersection
between Hawthorne and the transcendentalists is their use of alchemical tropes. Alchemy
is, indeed, a favorite motif for Hawthorne, and its appearance in his stories reveals
commentary on its transcendental ideals. While that commentary does not always depict
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alchemy as a legitimate practice, Hawthorne has his moments when he does portray
alchemy as just that. This varied and seemingly contradictory use of alchemy contributes
to the ambiguity that defines Hawthorne as an artist, and it, in turn, reveals a more
complex relationship with transcendentalism than is traditionally thought.
Hawthorne’s use of alchemy in his fiction has been well documented. Those
stories that contain overt alchemical figures or symbols include “The Birthmark,” “Dr.
Heidegger’s Experiment,” “Peter Goldthwaite’s Treasure,” and “The Great Carbuncle” as
well as his novel The Scarlet Letter. Hawthorne also left an unfinished manuscript at his
death titled “Septimius Felton, or, the Elixir of Life,” which, as its title suggests, has
alchemical themes. All of these stories contain exoteric alchemy, or the literal alchemy
that involves lab work, alembics, and actual substances. But esoteric alchemy, with its
symbolic and philosophical aspects, also abounds in stories such as “Rappaccini’s
Daughter,” “Ethan Brand,” The House of the Seven Gables and The Marble Faun (whose
British title was Transformation). The nature of esoteric alchemy, however, makes it
difficult to identify, especially in the absence of obvious alchemical equipment or
substances, such as Aylmer’s laboratory and furnace or Dr. Heidegger’s Fountain of
Youth. The alchemy in “Artist of the Beautiful,” the story I will examine in this chapter,
has particularly gone unnoticed because it is largely esoteric, rather than exoteric, and,
therefore, easily overlooked.
The mere presence of alchemy in Hawthorne’s stories does not suggest that he
embraces it wholeheartedly. The purpose of Hawthorne’s use of alchemy is actually a
contested point among critics. Randall Clack contextualizes alchemy within an American
framework, showing how Hawthorne’s contemporaries, such as Poe and Fuller, also use
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alchemy to promote a theme of regeneration. He also claims Hawthorne equates love
with the elixir vitae or the philosopher’s stone as a transmuting agent. He surveys the
common thread of alchemy that runs through such stories as “The Birthmark,” “The
Great Carbuncle,” and The Scarlet Letter in an effort to show love as a powerful
transmuting force. Thus, according to Clack, Hawthorne’s use of alchemy is a trope that
idealizes unselfish love in relationships, particularly marriage. More often, though, critics
portray Hawthorne as skeptical of alchemy, with its fantastic goals of eternal life and
youth, arguing he uses it as a tool to discredit the characters associated with it. These
critics base their conclusions on the assumption that Hawthorne values genuinely
spiritual endeavors, yet he portrays alchemy in an ultimately materialist way. David Van
Leer, for example, believes Hawthorne equates alchemy with magic, and in that sense his
alchemists manipulate matter through “witchcraft.” According to Van Leer, the medieval
alchemists alluded to in “The Birthmark”—Paracelsus and Cornelius Agrippa most
notably—come from a tradition of “crypto-materialism” because they misdefine spirit as
“etherealized matter,” which can then be worked on and transformed into physical
manifestations of that spirit. Van Leer asserts that Hawthorne would have been deeply
skeptical of such manipulation of matter because it “unites matter and spirit in a way
ultimately fatal to the latter” (215). Thus, “the first order of business” for Hawthorne is
to “cry out against the follies of yesterday and tomorrow” embodied in “an alchemical
tradition of spiritualized matter” (218).
Arthur Versluis, in echoing this view, argues that “For Hawthorne, the esoteric
traditions [e.g. alchemy] represent something to be feared or mistrusted” (81), and that
any physical practices based on alchemical or mystical philosophy are regarded by him
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with “fascinated horror” (89). However, Versluis also acknowledges that Hawthorne’s
representations of alchemy are not consistent, for in the Elixir of Life Manuscripts he
portrays “an English alchemical tradition that isn’t denigrated … at all, but is seen as
quite real and not at all necessarily bad” (85). This one favorable depiction of alchemy
does not, in the end, convince Verlsuis that Hawthorne embraces it, for he maintains that
“spiritual connotations…are wholly absent from Hawthorne’s portrayal” of alchemy (84),
and one thing critics do agree on is that Hawthorne is invested in the spiritual.
But if Hawthorne indeed mistrusted alchemy, why did he spend so much time
with it? The depth of Hawthorne’s alchemical knowledge is not shallow in the least; in
fact, he had much more than a common or passing acquaintance with its philosophy, as
Charles Swann notes in his discussion of The Elixir of Life Manuscripts: “Hawthorne
clearly knew far more about alchemy than simply the bare fact that alchemists were
interested in turning base metals into gold or in the search for the elixir of life” (375).
John Gatta, Jr.’s conclusions comes closest to what I see is happening with alchemy in
Hawthorne, which is that Hawthorne is skeptical of a physical, occultish alchemy but is
sympathetic to its spiritual ideals. The crucial distinction in defining this idealism in
Hawthorne lies with the difference between exoteric and esoteric alchemy, with esoteric
alchemy being what Hawthorne advocates because it is a philosophy of the spiritual.
Exoteric alchemy has always been viewed skeptically because its promise of eternal
youth and wealth defies the limits of possibility, and Hawthorne’s realism would not
allow such fantasies to go unchallenged. But as alchemical texts show, the spiritual or
psychological refinement of an individual has always been considered the “true” project
of alchemy, of which the material substances are mere by-products. This spiritual,
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esoteric alchemy exists in transcendental philosophy and literature; it also, I believe,
drives Hawthorne’s extensive use of alchemy in “The Artist of the Beautiful” by
providing a structure for the plot, the characters and the themes.
An examination of Hawthorne’s relationship to alchemy and transcendentalism
would need to include a close look at “Artist” and its alchemist/transcendentalist, Owen
Warland. Because Owen is an artistic figure and because the alchemical work he
undertakes represents the work of artistic production, an interpretation of Hawthorne’s
use of alchemy in this story may lead to conclusions regarding his attitudes toward
transcendental aesthetic practices. While such conclusions can easily become simplistic,
which is problematic for a writer as intentionally ambiguous as Hawthorne is, his
repeated use of alchemy suggests some consistency for him regarding the ideology it
represents. Although many critics have recognized Owen as a representative
transcendentalist—and particularly a transcendentalist who is a weak and ineffectual
artist—no one, as far as I can find, has addressed him as an alchemist. Yet, as an esoteric
alchemist, Owen is, I contend, characterized as empowered. Such a characterization of
Owen consequently suggests an affinity on Hawthorne’s part for the transcendental
discourse associated with esoteric alchemy.
I
“Artist of the Beautiful” was written in 1843, in the midst of other alchemical
stories such as “The Birthmark” and “Rappaccini’s Daughter.” It contains familiar
themes that run throughout many of Hawthorne’s stories, such as questions regarding the
moral and social viability of mysterious pursuits. One important Hawthornian theme in
“Artist” is the dichotomy between spirit and matter that makes up much of transcendental
discussions. Owen Warland symbolizes the spiritual in both the artist and his art. In
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direct contrast is Peter Hovenden, a former watchmaker who only values the utilitarian
over the superfluous existence of art. By virtue of his former vocation, Peter is
symbolized by a favorite trope of mechanistic philosophy, a watch with “springs and
wheels” (Hobbes 3). Peter’s daughter Annie, along with her fiancé and later husband,
Robert Danforth the blacksmith, are also aligned with the utilitarian values of Peter, even
though they represent varying degrees of matter. All three act as the antagonist to Owen,
but Peter especially is set up as his direct opposite. With his ethic of utility and physical
strength, Peter cannot abide Owen’s artisan, even superfluous, character. As such, Owen
especially feels threatened by Peter. Through the small and delicate Owen, Hawthorne
portrays the spiritual as the underling that must assert its importance in a world
dominated by the material. As the plot unfolds, the narrator’s commentary affirms the
undervalued but, nonetheless, valuable qualities of the spiritual.
Most critics acknowledge the opposition of spirit and matter in “Artist,” and they
also conclude that Hawthorne clearly sides with the spiritual. They don’t agree, however,
on what the tensions between the characters finally mean for Hawthorne’s aesthetic
project. Many critics argue that Hawthorne censures transcendentalism through the weak
and insignificant Owen, and their argument is usually based on an ironic narrator, which
is a common device in Hawthorne’s stories. An ironic narrator in “Artist” affects how we
view Hawthorne’s relationship to transcendentalism, for the seemingly positive
depictions of Owen, these critics claim, are actually ironic quips that reveal Hawthorne’s
deep skepticism of its claims. Two important critics, Millicent Bell and Nina Baym, see
the narrator’s descriptions of Owen and his achievement as ironic, largely because it
comes at the expense of human relationships. Bell calls Owen’s success a “melancholy
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triumph” (111) and claims it is “but half-comfort for his surrender of human happiness”
(108). Owen himself, as a symbol of the spiritual and transcendental ideal, is not only
small, weak, and “restricting,” but he and his butterfly are “unimportant,” even “pathetic”
(105). Nina Baym echoes Bell’s reading even more forcefully by calling the butterfly “a
fragile, cold bauble” that illustrates Owen’s “shrunken…conception of art” (110). Thus,
Baym suggests we must read against the narrator’s language to get at the limitations an
artist such as Owen represents. 12
In the context of Hawthorne’s clear use of irony in his other stories, Bell’s and
Baym’s interpretation may be justified, but such an emphasis on irony overlooks the
many straightforward statements made by Hawthornian narrators. Thus, some critics
choose to read the narrator in “Artist” at face value and, consequently, as a ratification of
transcendental ideals. Veronica Bassil, for instance, rejects an ironic reading by
suggesting the myth of Psyche and Eros as a source for the symbolism of the butterfly.
Because Psyche is a symbol of the soul, and because the butterfly is used as a symbol of
Psyche, she makes the connection between source and symbol to conclude with a reading
that describes Owen’s spiritual metamorphosis: “Artist of the Beautiful,” she says, is
about Owen’s soul and the stages it goes through to reach a transcendent state. Sheldon
W. Liebman also describes Owen’s “arduous spiritual pilgrimage” (86) as occurring in
stages, which epitomize Owen as a Romantic artist who must navigate his way through
many opposing forces.
Bassil’s and Liebman’s interpretations of the story are almost alchemical
readings. As Jung points out in Symbols of Transformation, “the butterfly is a symbol
12

For more recent criticism that depicts Owen as a transcendental failure, see
Urban and Bromwell.
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and allegory of the psyche” (250), especially as the psyche undergoes a process of
deepening self-consciousness. The caterpillar in its dark cocoon represents the first
unenlightened stages of the process, with the gradual change from a base and earthy
creature to a beautiful and heavenly “air-sylph,” as Coleridge puts it (285), representing
the progressive nature of self-transformation. Liebman’s observation of these stages
particularly includes the presence of the opposing forces that make up much of
alchemical/transcendental discourse: “the central figure in the story is not just an artist
but a Romantic artist, caught between the antitheses of ideal and real, spirit and matter,
imagination and understanding, and art and criticism” (85). The butterfly represents the
possibility of resolving these conflicts, and is, in that sense, an alchemical symbol.
Alchemy presents the binary of spirit and matter in nature and then seeks to unify them
through a harmonious relationship in which both are necessary for nature’s functions.
Reconciling spirit and matter is precisely what Owen succeeds at doing with his
spiritualized mechanical butterfly so that it serves as an alchemical emblem for
reconciliation. But the butterfly is also an emblem of Owen himself, which means the
reconciliation of the butterfly’s opposing elements (its mechanism fused with the spirit
Owen gives it) represents his own inner unity. This inner unity also incorporates the
other antitheses that Liebman mentions, particularly of art and criticism as they are linked
to the ideal and real.
Because “Artist” has never been read as an alchemical allegory, Owen has never
been seen as an alchemist. He has often been compared to Aylmer from “The
Birthmark,” though, because the themes of the two stories are so similar, and that
similarity, I suggest, carries over to the central place alchemy takes in both stories. As
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Owen works in his shop, the description of his physical appearance is similar to that of
Aylmer as he works in his laboratory. Aylmer, the alchemist, is “pale as death, anxious
and absorbed” as he “hung over the furnace” that brewed his concoction (187). Such a
picture connotes the mad scientist who is so intent on his delicate work that he
completely insulates himself from the distractions around him. Likewise, the first
description we get of Owen is of “his pale face bent earnestly over some piece of
mechanism on which was thrown the concentrated luster of a shade-lamp” (248). As the
story progresses, Owen becomes “more and more absorbed in a secret occupation which
drew all his science and manual dexterity into itself” (252).
Furthermore, Aylmer’s studies take him far beyond the utility of science and into
areas that even he deems dangerous. He is one of the many “ardent votaries” of
eighteenth-century science, which believed that man could find the “mysteries of Nature”
to the extent that a “philosopher” may eventually “lay his hand on the secret of creative
force” (175). While the narrator does not say that Aylmer has gone this far in his studies,
we are later told that he had, in his past, come close to such Frankenstein-like goals by
studying “the wonders of the human frame, and attempt[ing] to fathom the very process
by which Nature assimilates all her precious influences from earth and air, and from the
spiritual world, to create and foster man, her masterpiece” (180). In his flirtations with
the power of creation, Aylmer, like Victor Frankenstein, 13 pushes the limits of what had
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See Frankenstein (24-39) for Victor Frankenstein’s explanation of his
alchemical studies that lead him to a preoccupation with creative powers. Aylmer’s
studies and interests are almost identical. Aylmer’s sources for his study of Nature match
those of Victor Frankenstein: Albertus Magnus, Cornelius Agrippa, and Paracelsus—all
alchemists of the Middle Ages. These alchemists are also referenced in “Artist.”
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so far been distinguished as mortal versus divine ability, and in doing so, he illustrates
one aspect of the alchemical quest, which is to find the secrets of creation.
Owen’s quest to spiritualize a mechanical butterfly is, in essence, the same thing
as discovering the creative force, for Owen is not only “attempting to imitate the
beautiful movements of nature” (250) but to have power over them. By giving a
mechanism the animation of spirit, Owen is also giving it a soul, thereby becoming its
master and creator in a God-like manner. Delving into the deep unknown of creation is
one of the fantastical pursuits scoffed at by the naysayers of alchemy, so that alchemists
protected themselves against ridicule by clouding their studies in mysterious or secretive
language. Like Aylmer, then, Owen does not openly talk about his esoteric work, which
is described as the “hidden mysteries” (250) and “a secret occupation” (252). Particularly
in light of the skepticism toward his work that he endures from Peter, Owen conceals his
butterfly from those he cannot trust. At one point, for example, Owen had hoped to tell
Annie of his secret work, but after her visit where she ruins the butterfly, these hopes are
dashed. He says, “I yearned for sympathy, and thought, and fancied, and dreamed that
you might give it me; but you lack the talisman, Annie, that should admit you into my
secrets” (259). Thus, as a typical alchemist, Owen guards the work he does on the
butterfly very carefully.
The theme of time that runs throughout the story subtly reveals Owen to be an
alchemist. On one level, time represents the utilitarian and finite values of Peter and the
townspeople, and Owen partakes of those values to a certain extent through his vocation
as watchmaker. On another level, however, time refers paradoxically to Owen’s spiritual
endeavors. Mircea Eliade explains that early alchemists believed that the minerals in the
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earth would eventually become gold through the natural processes that occur through
time. In their attempt to modify matter, the alchemists were actually trying to speed up
this process artificially, so that the alchemist’s “labours replace the work of Time” (8).
The concept of time within alchemy, therefore, is symbolically connected to the
refinement process. Eliade further explains, “to collaborate in the work of Nature, to help
her to produce at an ever-increasing tempo, to change the modalities of matter—
here…lies one of the key sources of alchemical ideology” (8). Owen’s earthly
watchmaking skills are the beginning point for his ability to “change the modalities of
matter,” so that the theme of time not only places Owen within the dichotomy of the
empirical and spiritual, but it reveals him to be a reconciler of its contradictions.
Likewise, alchemists begin with the practical skills of experimentation in a lab, and they
perform their experiments not to merely create useful objects but to refine the nature of
humankind. The material, then, is a means to a spiritual end; it opens the door to loftier
pursuits. The fact that Owen controls the clocks of the town, that he may move time
around as he wills, is a symbolic gesture toward his alchemical ability to combine spirit
and matter with the intent of a material regeneration. Annie Hovenden even points out to
her father that “Owen is inventing a new kind of timekeeper,” (248)—a pun on the
alchemical labor Owen performs on himself. The theme of time, then, places him clearly
within the “alchemical ideology” that Eliade describes.
In addition, many other symbols clarify Owen’s stance as an alchemist, such as
references to seasonal changes, which signify regeneration after a period of decay, and
colors that correspond to the stages the philosopher’s stone undergoes in the laboratory.
But most importantly, the story is structured around a butterfly motif, incorporating
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Owen’s character and his struggles. Owen is explicitly described with butterfly imagery,
in that he is “seized with a fluttering of the nerves” (252) and he pursues a “flitting
mystery” (257). At the end of the story, Owen reveals how his identity is completely
wrapped up in the butterfly when he tells Annie, “[I]t has absorbed my own being into
itself” (268). In addition, his chasing after butterflies is “an apt emblem of the ideal
pursuit in which he had spent so many golden hours” (257). Of course, “golden” is an
obvious reference to alchemy, but the “ideal pursuit” also refers to the abstract idealism
that drives alchemy, of which a priori or intuitive knowledge is a part. Thus, the
butterflies of nature act as inspiration for his own pursuit, not only as mechanisms to
imitate but as the embodiment of a spiritual, “beautiful idea.” The same inspiration is
later repeated for Owen following a period of drinking and dissipation. A butterfly flies
through an open window and “fluttered about his head” (260), thereby acting as “a spirit
commissioned to recall him to the pure, ideal life” (261).
Winged creatures are common symbols of alchemy, and the butterfly is a
particular image of sublimation, especially in its relationship to the psyche’s
regeneration. Another important alchemical meaning of the butterfly is its quadrangle
form, which would then associate it with the mandala, a symbol of unity or wholeness
according to Jung. 14 A close analysis of the story reveals that Owen rises and falls
according to the success and failure of his mechanized butterfly four times, in progressive
stages, which gives the structure of the story a quadrangle form. Each of Owen’s failures
comes after the appearance of one of the antagonists: The first after Danforth’s visit, the
second after Peter’s visit, the third after Annie’s, and the fourth after Peter’s
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See Psychology and Alchemy, Chapter 3, “The Symbolism of the Mandala.”
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announcement of Annie’s and Danforth’s marriage in which he acts as the representative
of all three. Each failure represents a different stage for Owen within the alchemical
process. Arriving at the final stage of the philosopher’s stone is considered a difficult
task so that an alchemist must make several attempts before he is successful. It is a
given, then, that an alchemist will fail in his attempts, but that those failures are necessary
for the knowledge he will need to eventually be successful. These failures are often
talked about as a death and as bringing on spiritual darkness, from which the alchemist
must work his way out toward a brighter existence represented by the light of the sun.
Such imagery of darkness and light and of death and rebirth is invoked by the
narrator as he describes Owen’s turning points. In the first stage, when Robert Danforth
visits Owen’s shop, his large stature casts a physical shadow over Owen, but his
incapacity to understand Owen’s “passion for the beautiful” also dampens Owen’s
enthusiasm for his work on the butterfly. Owen acknowledges to himself that his work
looks “so vain and idle whenever my path is crossed by Robert Danforth” and that “His
hard brute force darkens and confuses the spiritual element within me.” Moments later,
when he ruins his butterfly with a careless stroke, he describes “the influence of that brute
force [Danforth]” as “the vapour” that has “obscured my perception.” As he sits “in
strange despair” contemplating his failure, his lamp goes out, leaving “the Artist of the
Beautiful in darkness” (254). Within this spiritual darkness, Owen is a changed man, and
he works for the sake of utility for a little while, keeping the town clock and working
with “dogged industry” (254) for his customers. The other three stages are described in a
similar manner, with Owen being overshadowed by darkness after a slight but fatal
mistake ruins the butterfly. He spends a winter lost in the “gloom” of wine after Annie’s
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visit, and after Peter’s final visit announcing Annie’s marriage to Danforth, he becomes
very ill. Earlier he works nights locked in his shop, and even the daylight, “to the morbid
sensibility of his mind, seemed to have an intrusiveness that interfered with his pursuits”
(257-58). Such imagery of death, darkness, and sleep suggest that Owen is like his
butterfly in the formation stages, like a caterpillar in its cocoon. He is a lone figure,
isolating himself in his shop while he works secretly on his butterfly.
This isolation is what Baym and Bell deem “pathetic” and “restricting,” and it is
what they believe the narrator condemns in Owen. However, when we read this story
alchemically, Owen’s isolation takes on new significance. In the first step of exoteric
alchemy, separatio, the elements of a substance are broken down and separated in order
to reveal the prima materia underneath. When translated into esoteric alchemy’s
symbolism, this separation is enacted by the alchemist in his voluntary removal from the
“base” elements of society. A British pamphlet published in 1714 titled “A Short
Enquiry Concerning the Hermetic Art” declares the importance of an alchemist’s
seclusion: “…the Alchemist undertakes no light task. I can hold out no hope of success
to those who still retain an absorbing interest in the world. In the world Adepts may be,
but not of it. Alchemy is a jealous mistress, she demands from pupils no less than life”
(15). Also, at the symbolic level, this separation is a psychological separation in the
consciousness, as described by Schelling, where the self becomes an object of study.
Thus, the substance in the alembic in its separated form represents man’s study of his
own soul. In Owen’s case, his isolation is not only an integral step in his role as
alchemist, but it is a reflection of his mind serving as the substance in his alembic.
Because he and the butterfly mirror each other in a macrocosmic/microcosmic
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correspondence, we know that the butterfly is the physical manifestation of his
psychological labors. As the butterfly is kept hidden until the end, Owen, too, hides
himself away until his labor is finished.
When Owen does comes out of his separatio stage in the end and allows the
object of his labors to be displayed for Peter, the Danforths and their child, the butterfly is
imaged specifically as the philosopher’s stone, with it’s “purple and gold-speckled
wings” (267). The mechanism itself, in uniting spirit and matter, represents Owen’s
exoteric labor, which he knew would impress those from whom he felt the need of
vindication. But the image of the butterfly on the ebony box represents his own
emotional and psychological transformation. It’s contrast of ebony and pearl show the
cycles of darkness and light Owen had undergone throughout the story. But even more,
the image on the box portrays Owen’s pursuits in the context of the transcendental or
“beautiful” idea behind a purely symbolic philosopher’s stone—the beautiful idea of an
enlightened mind. It shows “a boy in pursuit of a butterfly,” which then becomes “a
winged spirit” that is “flying heavenward” (267). The boy on the box also “ascend[s]
from earth to cloud, and from cloud to celestial atmosphere,” in order to catch the
transformed butterfly. Owen’s box, therefore, tells the tale of his own alchemical (i.e.
psychological) transformation, and, as such, reveals Owen to be an effective
transcendental figure. As a symbol of sublimation, the butterfly throughout the story
represents not only Owen’s change from a material watchmaker to the creator of a
spiritual creature, but particularly of his spiritual progress from a “low” man who is
fearful, overly-emotional, and bitter to one who overcomes these weaknesses as a result
of the higher knowledge he has gained from his labors.

Brocious 71
II
As I noted previously, the mere fact of alchemy in one of Hawthorne’s story does
not necessarily mean he is promoting or embracing it. But I believe there is enough
evidence in “Artist” to suggest that Hawthorne is not scornful of his alchemist here or of
the work he pursues. Contrary to Bell’s and Baym’s claims that the narrator’s irony
devalues Owen, I see the narrator’s tone as actually deflecting sarcasm away from him
and toward the materialists who undervalue or misunderstand him. For example, after
Owen experiences a devastating setback with his butterfly, a change comes over him: he
works at his job and completely neglects his butterfly. The narrator describes this change
in Owen as “cold, dull, nameless,” (254). But the narrator also calls this change a “happy
transformation” (255) in connection to Peter Hovenden, who thinks “the alteration was
entirely for the better” (254). Of course, we cannot trust Peter’s opinions regarding
Owen, for Peter is depicted as sneering and contemptuous in the face of Owen’s
emotional vulnerability. The narrator’s irony, therefore, works in Owen’s favor rather
than against it.
Later in the story when Owen resumes his butterfly chasing and nightly seclusion
after a bout of drinking and idleness, the townspeople believe Owen to be mad. But the
narrator, rather than condemning Owen for his strange behavior, condemns the
townspeople for their lack of sympathy:
The townspeople had one comprehensive explanation of all these
singularities. Owen Warland had gone mad! How universally
efficacious—how satisfactory, too, and soothing to the injured sensibility
of narrowness and dullness—is this easy method of accounting for
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whatever lies beyond the world’s most ordinary scope! From St. Paul’s
days down to our poor little Artist of the Beautiful, the same talisman had
been applied to the elucidation of all mysteries in the words or deeds of
men who spoke or acted too wisely or too well. In Owen Warland’s case
the judgement [sic] of his townspeople may have been correct. Perhaps he
was mad. The lack of sympathy—that contrast between himself and his
neighbours which took away the restraint of example—was enough to
make him so. (261)
While the narrator does not deny that Owen is different or eccentric compared to
the people he lives among, he scoffs at the townspeople, who in their “ordinary scope”
protect their “injured sensibility of narrowness and dullness” by condemning Owen. In
their rejection of Owen, the townspeople are partially to blame for his eccentricities, for
they don’t extend the hand of acceptance or friendship that would bring him into the
mainstream. On the other hand, “poor” Owen has “acted too wisely or too well” in his
higher ability to comprehend the mysterious. Thus, in this passage Owen is hardly cast as
a character we should scorn, but as someone we should not only sympathize with but
recognize as possessing admirable qualities, which are nothing less than the higher
consciousness of the poet-prophet as described by Coleridge.
Granted, the narrator’s tone toward alchemists in other stories is one of
skepticism, perhaps even ridicule, and a common interpretation of alchemy in “The
Birthmark” could continue with other stories as well: any character associated with
alchemy is a failure. Most of Hawthorne’s alchemists are failures, but not because they
don’t successfully perform alchemical experiments, for in that regard, they are mostly
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successful. However, their experiments do not end in the manner the alchemist had
hoped. Rappaccini and Aylmer, for example, both perform seemingly impossible feats
with their alchemy so that they both become arrogant in their abilities. As a result of an
overestimation of their powers, they both kill a woman they love. The voice of the
narrator in these stories often provides subtle commentary that questions and condemns
what these alchemists are doing. Hence, after Georgiana’s death at Aylmer’s hands, the
narrator concludes with this clear censure of his actions: “Yet, had Aylmer reached a
profounder wisdom, he need not thus have flung away [his] happiness…he failed to look
beyond the shadowy scope of time…to find the perfect future in the present” (192). Such
a statement is an illustration of why critics read Hawthorne as condemning alchemy, for
his alchemists are often portrayed as misguided idealists who invest their hopes in
something other than the people around them and, therefore, miss out on the richness of
the life sitting right before their eyes.
Notwithstanding Owen’s similarities to Aylmer, however, I believe Hawthorne is
doing something different with him. The most obvious difference is the tone of
satisfaction the narrator gives to the conclusion of Owen’s story:
And as for Owen Warland, he looked placidly at what seemed the ruin of
his life’s labour, and which was yet no ruin. He had caught a far other
butterfly than this. When the artist rose high enough to achieve the
beautiful, the symbol by which he made it perceptible to mortal senses
became of little value in his eyes while his spirit possessed itself in the
enjoyment of the reality.” (272)
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Aylmer misses out on “the reality,” while Owen “possessed” himself in its enjoyment; in
contrast to Aylmer’s ruin, Owen’s “life’s labour” is “yet no ruin.” Here is a very distinct
difference: Aylmer fails but Owen succeeds, and he succeeds in a distinctly
transcendental vein, as one who “has caught a far other butterfly” of self-knowledge.
Hawthorne here seems to make a distinction between the two kinds of alchemy:
purely exoteric alchemy brings misery and ultimate failure, but esoteric alchemy brings
enjoyment and personal fulfillment. Hawthorne clearly does not believe in a literal
philosopher’s stone as a panacea for illness, old age, poverty, or sorrow, and he does not
believe man could, or should, find the secrets of creation. Thus, I believe Hawthorne did
scoff at the claims of exoteric alchemy through Aylmer and characters like him.
Hawthorne draws a line where the possibilities of science end and where the privileges of
God begin. Even Aylmer unwillingly admits that “our great creative Mother [Nature]” is
“severely careful to keep her own secrets.” He recognizes that Nature is “like a jealous
patentee,” allowing us to “mar” or destroy but “on no account to make” (180). If we look
at Hawthorne’s failed alchemists, such as Aylmer, Heidegger, and Rappaccini, they are
preoccupied with the literal, exoteric experiments of alchemy that encroach on God’s
domain. In their work in labs or pseudo-labs, they all ultimately overlook the
correspondence between themselves and the substances in their alembics. But Owen
focuses on the esoteric side of alchemy—in other words, on himself as a substance that
needs refining—and this yields very different results.
On another level, the esoteric alchemy of the story is meant to represent the
creative process an artist undergoes in his production of art. While the term “artist”
signifies alchemy (alchemy is often referred to as “the Art”) it also has obvious
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connections to a producer of works of art, especially to a literary artist such as
Hawthorne. As a trope of artistic creation, the esoteric alchemy in “Artist” resembles the
transcendental model of genius in which the artist (or “poet”) is a prophet who creates
works of art that are meant to recall society back to the spiritual, precisely as Emerson
calls American artists to do. According to the transcendentalists, such as Coleridge and
Emerson, translating a piece of literature from vision to words is a transformation process
that ends with the presentation of a priori truth, and Owen’s butterfly, as an image of art,
alchemy, and spiritual truth, enacts such a model. In addition, the butterfly is an image of
Schelling’s claim that works of art are a manifestation of the spiritual. Its beauty, Owen
tells Annie, “is not merely outward, but deep as its whole system” (268), and its
appearance as “a material trifle” actually “symboliz[es] a lofty moral,” that the artist has
the ability to convert “what was earthly to spiritual gold” (270). As Owen expected, none
of his antagonists recognize the spiritual nature of his art because they, as representatives
of empirical society, have been blinded by materialism’s apathy toward the spiritual.
They only see his butterfly as an impressive plaything, clever and pretty, but ultimately as
a waste of time. As Robert Danforth expresses it, “There is more real use in one
downright blow of my sledge-hammer than in the whole five years’ labour that our friend
Owen has wasted on this butterfly” (269). If there is a chord of melancholy to Owen’s
story, it is regret that an artist’s work is only valued for its impressive material
appearance, but that its real value, “the exercises and manifestations of the spirit” (265),
remains neglected.
But this story seems to suggest that the creation of art, if overlooked or scorned by
society, does something for the artist at a deep personal level: it allows the artist himself
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to partake of the transformational nature of art. As a result of this personal regeneration,
the artist may then transcend the opinion of others in favor of his own, wiser opinion.
Such is one dimension of esoteric alchemy, and it is shown in the story by Owen’s
eventual confidence in his work in the face of society’s indifference. Despite the
achievement he brings to the Danforth’s fireside in the form of the spiritualized butterfly,
Owen knows what the reaction will be: misunderstanding of his life’s work and of the
full implications of its worth. But this time he does not shrink in the face of Danforth’s
strength, Peter’s sneer, or Annie’s “secret scorn” as he once did. He has learned to
detach himself from the effects of such reactions, and he responds with an almost stoic
placidity: “in the latter stages of his pursuit,” the narrator tells us, Owen “had risen out of
the region in which such a discovery might have been torture” (269-70). His acceptance
of Annie’s opinion rests with the belief he comes to have that the “reward of all high
performance must be sought within itself, or sought in vain” (270). Thus, Owen is not
devastated by the destruction of the butterfly by Annie’s child, for his complacency is
founded on a transcendental ideal: he had “risen high enough to achieve the beautiful”
(272).
The symbol of this transcendence, the butterfly, is no longer necessary as long as
Owen’s “spirit possessed itself in the enjoyment of the reality” (272). As an esoteric
alchemist he obtains the proverbial philosopher’s stone that is tangible to himself alone
since those he offers it to cannot or will not see it for what it is. Owen, as transcendental
artist, portrays the spiritual as a legitimate alternative to materialism’s short-sightedness,
especially as that short-sightedness misses the purposive scope of artist work. This
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transcendental state of consciousness may seem unusual for a Hawthornian character, but
it is the ideal Hawthorne measures his other characters against.
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EPILOGUE
As I have previously noted, little work has been done in literary criticism to
contextualize alchemy within a larger scope than mere recognition of its imagery in
fiction, prose and poetry. Indeed, few critics have attempted to explain why in the
nineteenth century—a time when Enlightenment ideals had been culturally internalized
and when science had become sterile of feeling, emotion, and metaphoric language—an
old form of pre-Enlightenment science appears in philosophy and literature. But as
Schmidt proposes for mysticism, alchemy served a purpose for those writers who used it.
I have attempted in this project to examine a couple of these purposes, namely its role as
a spiritual discourse in the transcendental reactions against purely empirical philosophy
and in the formulations of artistic creativity.
Caught up in the paradigm of transcendental genius is a central investment in the
individual. Certainly, one of alchemy’s most important functions is its ready-made
discourse of self-regeneration through a becoming consciousness. Writing in 1857,
Ethan Allen Hitchcock (curiously, a well-respected army general who was also a leading
expert in alchemy) seizes upon the individualistic implications of alchemy in the preface
for his book Alchemy and the Alchemists. He asserts, “the author thinks it a duty to
declare the opinion he has derived from a careful reading of many alchemical volumes,
and in the following remarks he has taken for his thesis the proposition that Man was the
subject of Alchemy; and that the object of the Art was the perfection, or at least the
improvement, of Man” (iv). Such is the legacy of a cultural exchange across the Atlantic
from America to Europe. If Germany was the folkloric nucleus for alchemical traditions
from which we may trace a line through Britain and then to America, the political
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movement begun in America that was seen to encapsulate the importance of the
individual quite likely supplied the impetus to apply alchemical ideology for modern
purposes in Europe. The texts I have examined here—from Kant’s subjectivity, to
Schelling’s objectification of self, to Coleridge’s genius of higher consciousness, to
Hawthorne’s isolated artist—all explore the dimensions of a Self as the starting point for
any discovery of knowledge. Thus, alchemy as an individualist philosophy is one
representation of an exported influence America provided to the countries it usually
imported culture from.
I have also tried to demonstrate in this project the emphasis alchemy placed on
human possibilities and how those promises of human potential dominated the
transcendental discourse. I have also recognized the transcendental awareness of the
impossibilities of their idealism within the parameters of alchemical paradox. Although
many critics are now focusing on the prevalence of subversion and even nihilism of the
time period against the traditional backdrop of Romantic idealism, I see the idealism of
the age as equally compelling. The idealism of the transcendentalists has become,
through the efforts of Abrams and other like-minded critics, the canonical version for the
Romantic aesthetic project. As such, the post-modern and deconstructive movements
were formulated in direct response to this privileged version of Romanticism. The
Romantics’ perceived investment in unity, harmony, and synthesis is precisely what we
now react against, so that in contrast to unity and synthesis, we now focus on disunity and
fragmentation; instead of harmony, we speak of discord and dissonance. Thus, our
present discussions of the Romantic time period have been formed specifically from the
perspective, skewed or otherwise, transcendental idealism articulated. In that sense,
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alchemy’s role within our own reactionary structures of cultural analysis is worth our
notice.
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